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ABSTRACT 
The Relationship Between Guilt- and Shame-Proneness and 
Rorschach Indices of Psychological Functioning 
by 
Julie Bingham Shiffler, Doctor of Philosophy 
Utah State University, 1997 
Major Professors: Dr. Susan L. Crowley 
Dr. Tamara J. Ferguson 
Department: Psychology 
The purpose of this study was to examine the 
relationship between the degrees of proneness to the self-
conscious emotions of nonruminative guilt, ruminative 
guilt, and shame and several indices of psychological 
functioning, including depression, narcissism, anger, 
dysphoric affect, cooperation, need for affection, and 
self-inspection, in a college population. Gender 
differences were also examined. 
A measure of psychological functioning (the 
Rorschach) and a measure of guilt- and shame-proneness 
(the Test of Self-Conscious Affect--Modified) were 
lV 
administered to 91 college students (43 males and 48 
females). Females reported higher levels of all three 
self-conscious emotions. The only gender difference found 
among the psychological functioning variables was higher 
levels of narcissism for males. For the total sample, 
cooperation was related to nonruminative guilt, whereas an 
unhealthy level of need for affection was related to 
ruminative guilt and shame. When males and females were 
considered separately, depression was related to 
ruminative guilt in males, but not in females. Narcissism 
was related to all three emotions for males, but not for 
females. An absence of dysphoric affect was associated 
with nonruminative guilt in females. Cooperation and 
self-inspection both correlated with nonruminative guilt 
for females, but not for males. The predominant emotion 
related to unhealthy levels of need for affection was 
shame for males but ruminative guilt for females. 
Preliminary results from 21 subjects with positive DEPI 
scores differed from the results of the entire sample in 
the relationships between the self-conscious emotions and 
dysphoric affect, self-inspection, and cooperation. 
Study results were discussed in light of the 
different levels of awareness at which the Rorschach and 
the TOSCA--M assess emotions and psychological 
functioning. Socialization of gender differences in 
guilt- and shame-proneness was also discussed. 
Implications for treatment, future research, and creation 
of future assessments of guilt- and shame-proneness were 
examined. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Psychologists have long been interested in finding 
ways to predict various forms of maladaptive behavior and 
psychopathology. In the interest of this goal, 
researchers have attempted to identify specific precursors 
to a variety of ineffective styles of intrapersonal and 
interpersonal functioning. Once discovered, such 
knowledge would facilitate the development and 
implementation of prevention, early intervention, and 
treatment strategies. 
One direction that researchers have taken is to 
examine the role of emotions in psychopathology. 
According to a functionalist perspective, emotions are 
adaptive to the situation (Magai & McFadden, 1995; 
Malatesta & Wilson, 1988), playing a role in determining 
whether and how information in the environment is 
perceived, interpreted, and acted upon. An emotion state 
is the immediate arousal of feeling and cognition in 
response to a situation. But emotions may also function 
as traits that define the individual's personality. This 
2 
occurs when the natural temperament of the individual 
interacts with experience over time to develop an affinity 
for specific emotions--an emotional style. These emotion 
traits or "affective biases" (Magai & McFadden, 1995) 
influence the way individuals perceive and interpret 
information , the coping and defensive strategies they 
routinely employ , and the way they behave. The normal 
result is the idiosyncracies or traits that constitute 
individual personalities. 
Fisher, Shaver, and Carnochan (1990) contend that 
when an individual repeatedly and consistently responds to 
a variety of situations with a particular emotion, that 
emotion can be considered a consistent aspect or 
personality trait of the individual, and the person is 
said to be prone to that emotion. Emotion traits serve to 
shape development and personality. But emotion styles 
become problematic when persistent reliance on a specific 
affective style to organize and interpret experience 
exposes the individual to an overabundance of an emotion. 
Such chronic exposure can lead to pathology. 
For many years, clinicians have observed high levels 
of guilt and shame in many of their clients and have 
posited an intuitive link between psychological symptoms 
and proneness to the emotions of shame and guilt. Helen 
Block Lewis (1971, 1979a, 1979b) focused on the proposed 
link in her theoretical writings. She hypothesized that 
guilt-prone persons are vulnerable to thought-related 
disorders, such as paranoia and obsessive-compulsive 
3 
disorder, whereas shame-proneness creates vulnerability to 
depression, hysteria, and narcissism. However, no 
longitudinal studies investigating this hypothesis have 
yet been conducted. In addition, H. B. Lewis postulated 
gender differences in proneness to the two emotions, with 
males more likely to exhibit guilt-proneness and females 
more inclined to shame-proneness. 
Research findings regarding sex-related differences 
in guilt-proneness and shame-proneness are mixed. 
However, a growing body of research suggests that females, 
more than males, may be socialized to experience guilt and 
shame. For example, females are socialized to place 
greater value on relationships than on performance and to 
exercise control over aggressive impulses and feelings of 
4 
anger. In contrast, the socialization of males emphasizes 
performance and is less likely to penalize aggression. 
These socialization differences are believed to result in 
a greater tendency on the part of females to experience 
feelings of guilt and shame, especially in the context of 
their relationships (Brody, 1996; Kaufman, 1989; H. B. 
Lewis, 1971; M. Lewis, 1992; Zahn-Waxler, Cole , & Barrett, 
1991; Zahn-Waxler & Kochanska, 1990). Males, on the other 
hand, might be expected to experience guilt in connection 
with performance that falls below expectations. These 
gender differences in proneness to guilt and shame are 
believed to contribute, in turn, to existing gender 
differences in some forms of psychopathology (H. B. Lewis, 
1971) . 
Empirical evidence for the link between guilt- and 
shame-proneness and psychological symptoms has increased 
in recent years. For example, shame-proneness is 
associated with general psychological maladjustment 
(Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992), depression (Harder, 
Cutler, & Rockart, 1992; Hoblitzelle, 1987; Shiffler, 
1993; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992; Wright, O'Leary, & 
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Balkin, 1989), narcissism (Gramzow & Tangney, 1992; Wright 
et al., 1989), and anger (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & 
Gramzow, 1992). A major role in the formation of 
psychological symptoms has also been attributed to guilt 
(e.g ., Blatt & Shichman, 1983; Harder et al., 1992; 
Leckman et al., 1984; H. B. Lewis, 1979a; Zuroff, 
Moskowitz, Wielgus, Powers, & Franko, 1983) . Consistent 
with this view, excessive guilt is related to depression 
and depressive symptomatology (Hoblitzelle, 1987; Jarrett 
& Weissenburger, 1990; Jones & Kugler, 1993; Leckman et 
al., 1984; Niler & Beck, 1989; Shiffler, 1993; Wright et 
al. , 198 9) . In the rare studies in which gender 
differences have been considere d, correlations between the 
emotion variables and depression have been slightly higher 
for males than for females (Shiff ler, 1993; Wright et al., 
1989) . 
The conclusions reached by many of the foregoing 
researchers must be viewed with caution because of 
limitations to their research. One important limitation 
is in the area of measurement, where two major problems 
have been identified. Adequate measurement of guilt- and 
shame-proneness was hampered in the past by disagreements 
about definitions of the two emotion constructs, 
particularly the definition of guilt. Many researchers, 
including H. B. Lewis, failed to recognize that guilt is 
not a unitary phenomenon (Ferguson & Crowley, 1993, 1996, 
in press a) . Guilt can be differentiated into at least 
two types, with an important distinction being the 
separation of guilt into ruminative and nonruminative 
types. Nonruminative guilt is a normal, functional 
emotion. It is characterized by a restless feeling of 
discomfort that occurs as a result of transgression, 
motivating the individual to make reparation for 
wrongdoing. Once the wrong has been corrected, 
nonruminative guilt dissipates (Tangney, 1991). On the 
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other hand, ruminative guilt is characterized by excessive 
rumination over transgressions and overcompensation for 
misdeeds, with the accompanying feeling that nothing the 
offender does will ever fully atone for the wrongful deed 
(Ferguson & Crowley, 1993). The individual who 
experiences ruminative guilt frequently accepts 
responsibility for events outside his or her control 
(Ferguson, 1996; Ferguson, Stegge, Miller, & Olsen, 1996; 
Friedman, 1985). This ruminative form of guilt is 
considered more problematic than nonruminative guilt and 
is expected to have a stronger link to psychopathology. 
Previous authors (Caprara, Manzi, & Perugini, 1992) have 
drawn a theoretical and operational distinction between 
"anxious guilt" and "empathic guilt." Anxious (i.e., 
ruminative) guilt is based on a fear of punishment and is 
related to neuroticism and a tendency to aggress. On the 
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other hand, empathic (i.e., nonruminative) guilt, which is 
orthogonal to aggression and unrelated to neuroticism, 
reflects a concern for the victim and a perceived need for 
reparation. 
Additional difficulties in studies of guilt and shame 
concern the manner in which the emotion constructs are 
operationalized. For example, many older measures of 
guilt (e.g., Buss-Durkee Hostility Inventory, Buss & 
Durkee, 1957; Mosher Forced-Choice Guilt Inventory, 
Mosher, 1966, 1968) are contaminated by items that are 
currently considered more indicative of shame. 
measures of guilt focus on either the empathic, 
Most newer 
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nonruminative form of guilt or the anxious, ruminative 
form of guilt, but not on both. In addition, many 
measures of psychopathology are limited by the tendency of 
some test takers to selectively over- or underendorse 
psychological symptoms. Even measures such as the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory--2 (MMPI--2; 
Dahlstrom, Butcher, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989) 
that include subtle, empirically keyed items can be 
invalidated by the test taker's response style. In these 
situations, an indirect measure of psychological 
functioning may be a more useful means of obtaining 
information. In responding to indirect measures, such as 
the Rorschach (Exner, 1993), the test taker is unaware of 
the significance of various characteristics of his or her 
response and is, therefore, unable to influence test 
scores through a tendency to respond in a socially 
appropriate manner. 
The Rorschach (Exner, 1993) is a cognitive-perceptual 
task that indirectly measures personality structure, 
psychopathology, and prosocial functioning. Responses are 
scored systematically, according to standardized scoring 
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criteria, resulting in a number of specific scores that 
each indicate the presence or absence of a particular 
style of personality, affective, or cognitive functioning. 
Because the test taker is unaware of the manner in which 
responses are scored and the significance of various 
responses, the ability to conceal psychological symptoms 
or negative aspects of functioning that create a 
vulnerability to psychopathology is reduced . 
The present research provides a more rigorous test of 
the proposed links between guilt-proneness (both 
ruminative guilt and nonruminative guilt), shame-
proneness, and psychopathology. This rigor derives from 
using a measure that indirectly assesses both 
psychological symptoms and prosocial functioning, together 
with a measure of guilt- and shame-proneness that 
effectively operationalizes the guilt and shame constructs 
and considers both ruminative and nonruminative guilt. 
The purpose of the present research is to investigate 
the relationships between proneness to shame, proneness to 
guilt, and psychological functioning and to examine gender 
differences in the relationships. This study attempts to 
improve on past research in four ways. 
First, the research employs assessment measures 
judged to be more clearly in line with the 
conceptualizations of guilt- and shame-proneness adopted 
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for the present research. The instrument employed for the 
assessment of guilt- and shame-proneness measures both the 
nonruminative style of guilt-proneness, which moves the 
individual to engage in prosocial behavior, and the 
ruminative features of guilt-proneness, characterized by 
continued rumination over one's behavior and 
overcompensation for misdeeds . Only a few prior studies 
have examined both the maladaptive and the prosocial 
functions of guilt-proneness (Cro wley & Ferguson, 1994, 
1995) . 
Second, the instrument used for assessing 
psychopathology in this research overcomes the problems of 
the social desirability response set of test takers who 
are reluctant to reveal psychological difficulties. Using 
an indirect measure reduces the ability of the test taker 
to intentionally conceal problem areas. This research 
improves upon past research by providing a view of the 
psychological functioning of the respondent that is 
uncluttered by the desire to respond in a socially 
appropriate manner. 
Third, the measure of psychological functioning for 
this research includes measures of adaptive, prosocial 
functioning. Therefore, it is possible to examine not 
only the potentially negative effects of proneness to 
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shame, ruminative guilt, and nonruminative guilt, but also 
the relationship of the three self-conscious emotions to 
healthy psychological and interpersonal functioning. 
Finally, this research cons iders gender differences 
in the relationships between t he emotion variables and 
psychological functioning. Although gender differences 
have been proposed in theory and some research evidence 
suggests the existence of gender differences, gender has 
not been considered in previous studies of guilt-
proneness, shame-proneness, and varied forms of 
psychopathology. 
This research examines whether the self-conscious 
emotions of shame-proneness, ruminative guilt-proneness, 
and nonruminative guilt-proneness are related to symptoms 
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of psychopathology and/or to healthy functioning, and 
whether gender differences exist in the relationships, by 
addressing the following research questions: 
1. Are there gender differences in this sample in 
the levels of proneness to shame, proneness to ruminative 
guilt, and proneness to nonrurninative guilt, as measured 
by the Test of Self-Conscious Affect--Modified (TOSCA--M; 
Tangney, Wagner, & Grarnzow, 1989; revisions by Ferguson & 
Crowley, 1993)? 
2. Are there gender differences in this sample in 
the levels of psychological symptoms, including depression 
(as measured by the depression index [DEPI] of the 
Rorschach [Exner, 1993]), narcissism (as measured by the 
reflection score of the Rorschach), anger (as measured by 
the white space [SJ responses to the Rorschach), and 
dysphoric affect (as measured by the sum of shading 
responses on the Rorschach)? 
3. Are there gender differences in this sample in 
the levels of prosocial tendencies, including positive 
interactions with other people (as measured by the 
cooperative movement [COP] score of the Rorschach), normal 
13 
need for closeness (as measured by the texture score of 
the Rorschach), and positive self-inspection (as measured 
by the form dimensionality [FD] score of the Rorschach)? 
4. For males and females, what is the multivariate 
relationship between the Rorschach symptom variables of 
depression (as measured by the DEPI), narcissism (as 
measured by the reflection score), anger (as measured by 
the S responses), dysphoric affect (as measured by the sum 
of shading responses), and the self-conscious emotion 
variables of shame-proneness, ruminative guilt-proneness, 
and nonruminative guilt-proneness, as measured by the Test 
of Self-Conscious Affect--Modified? 
5. For males and females, what is the multivariate 
relationship between the Rorschach positive psychological 
functioning variables of positive interactions with other 
people (as measured by the COP score), normal need for 
closeness (as measured by the texture responses), and 
positive self-inspection (as measured by the FD score) and 
the TOSCA--M variables of shame-proneness, ruminative 
guilt-proneness, and nonruminative guilt-proneness, for 
males and for females? 
It is hypothesized that females will have higher 
levels of depressive symptoms and dysphoric affect and 
that males will have higher levels of narcissism and 
14 
anger. Females are also expected to exhibit higher levels 
of each of the three prosocial tendencies and each of the 
three self - conscious emotions . It is predicted that 
sham e -proneness and ruminative guilt-proneness will be 
positively related to depressive symptomatology, 
narcissism, anger, and dysphoric affect. For females, it 
is expected that shame-proneness and ruminative guilt-
proneness will correlate positively with depressive 
symptomatology and dysphoric affect; whereas for males, it 
is expected that shame-proneness and ruminative guilt-
proneness will be positively related to anger and 
narcissism. It is anticipated that for males, ruminative 
guilt-proneness will be the predominant self-conscious 
emotion relating to psychological symptoms. For females, 
the strongest relationships are expected between the 
psychological symptoms and shame-proneness. These 
proposed gender differences, if obtained, are expected to 
represent different coping processes in men and women. It 
is also expected that nonruminative guilt-proneness will 
be positively related to adaptive, prosocial tendencies, 
with no statistically significant gender differences. 
15 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
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This review will summarize the current understanding 
of the relationship between guilt- and shame-proneness and 
symptoms of psychopathology. To begin, definitions of the 
constructs guilt, shame, guilt-proneness, and shame-
proneness will be provided. The distinction between 
ruminative and nonruminative guilt will be described, and 
the relationship between ruminative guilt and shame will 
be co nsidered . The theory of Helen Block Lewis will be 
incorporated into the definitions, including the proposed 
relationship between guilt- and shame-proneness and 
various forms of psychopathology. The theoretical 
relationship between each construct and vulnerability to 
psychopathology will then be discussed. The current state 
of research regarding the relationship between guilt, 
shame, and psychopathology will be summarized, including 
examination of measures used to assess guilt- and shame-
proneness and the limitations of the research. The focus 
will then turn to a discussion of the Rorschach as a 
measure of psychopathology and its possible advantages in 
examining the relationship between guilt- and shame-
proneness and psychological symptoms that contribute to 
psychopathology. 
Definitions 
Guilt and Shame as States 
17 
Considerable disagreement currently exists concerning 
which psychophysiological states should be regarded as 
primary, fundamental, or discrete emotions (cf. Ekman, 
1984; Fisher et al., 1990; Izard, 1977; Ortony, 1987; 
Ortony, Clore, & Foss, 1987; Plutchik, 1980; Roseman, 
Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Tomkins, 1972, 1980). In some 
taxonomies, guilt and shame are both considered to be 
primary emotions, and some systems include one but not the 
other. Other theories include neither guilt nor shame as 
primary emotions because o f the cognitive aspects of the 
two states. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this 
research, guilt and shame will both be regarded as 
emotions and, more specifically, as self-conscious 
emotions. 
According to current psychological theories, the 
18 
experiences of guilt and shame are separate but related 
emotions. Two factors differentiate guilt and shame, 
namely, the role of the self (H. B. Lewis, 1971) and the 
focus of the negative affect (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, 
et al., 1992). As a result, the two emotions produce 
distinct phenomenological experiences in adults (Lindsay -
Hartz, 1984; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, et al., 1992), and 
even in children as young as 7 and 8 years old (Ferguson, 
Stegge, & Damhuis, 1991). According to Barrett's (1995) 
functionalist approach, guilt and shame are social 
emotions that serve important functions. Each is 
associated with specific action tendencies and particular 
understandings about the self and others, although 
cognitive understanding is not required for the emergence 
of the emotions. Socialization obviously contributes to 
the development of shame and guilt, and this process 
contributes to the development of a sense of self. The 
state of guilt or shame is the immediate but temporary 
arousal of the emotion in situations that would, for most 
persons, evoke the emotion. 
19 
State of Shame 
Shame is adaptive at the state level and functions to 
suppress arrogance, foster humility, and promote adherence 
or deference to group norms and standards of behavior. As 
we consider actions that would violate society's norms and 
standards, this internal evaluation (either conscious or 
unconscious) of "what others would think" serves to keep 
our behavior within socially acceptable limits (Scheff, 
1988) . Shame occurs when there is a discrepancy between 
the ego and the ego ideal (Ward, 1972). It involves the 
painful realization that the individual is something that 
he or she did not want to be. It functions to sustain 
ideals about who one wants to be and to preserve one's 
commitment to personal goals (Lindsay-Hartz, de Rivera, & 
Mascolo, 1995). The desire of the self to remain worthy 
of respect motivates conformity to society's expectations. 
According to Helen Block Lewis (1979b), shame 
functions to restore the bond between the self and another 
person. It is "the self's vicarious experience of the 
other's negative evaluation" (p. 381). Although norm 
violations often trigger feelings of shame, the individual 
20 
experiencing shame does not focus on his or her behavior, 
but rather on the defective, worthless self, accompanied 
by a desire to hide rather than to make active reparation. 
This negative evaluation of the self rather than the 
behavior poses a threat to self-concept and identity. H. 
B. Lewis (1979b) stated that shame is the result of seeing 
the self from the viewpoint of the rejecting other for 
whom the self cares, and a normal reaction is hostility 
and an attempt to humiliate the other. However, the 
shamed individual values the other, and the thought of 
retaliation produces feelings of guilt. The only 
acceptable recourse is to direct the humiliated fury 
toward the self. The result may be tension, diffuse 
anxiety, or a drop in self-esteem. 
Because the entire self is the "target of attack" (H. 
B. Lewis, 1979b, p. 381), shame is a more devastatingly 
painful experience than guilt. The focus on the self 
rather than on behavior results in shame being more self-
conscious and private than guilt. It involves more 
autonomic reactions (e.g., blushing, sweating, increased 
heart rate) than guilt. The typical response to shame 
21 
involves lowering the head, averting the eyes, and wanting 
to disappear. Shame also tends to bind the tongue. As a 
result of its relative wordlessness, its imagery of being 
looked at, and its concrete autonomic activity, shame 
feels irrational and confus ing and is frequently 
compounded by shame over feeling shame. 
Other writers have described shame as a much more 
global and acutely painful experience than guilt (Lindsay-
Hartz, 1984; Tangney, 1989b). In shame, the entire self, 
not just the behavior, is negatively scrutinized by the 
self and found to be defective (Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; 
Tangney, 1990). There is a sense of being worthless and 
powerless (Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Tangney, 1989a, 1989b). 
The desire to deflect attention away from the exposed self 
produces a sense of shrinking and being small, and a 
longing to hide and withdraw from interpersonal contact or 
distance the self from the evaluating agent (Barrett, 
1995; Ward, 1972), although it is also possible to be 
ashamed as the self confronts the self. When it is not 
possible to elude the scrutiny of others, shame can 
motivate rage and aggression, which serve as a means of 
22 
escaping the interpersonal realm by distancing the 
individual from others (H. B. Lewis, 1979b; Lindsay-Hartz 
et al., 1995). 
State of Guilt 
Guilt, as a state, is the feeling of discomfort that 
accompanies the realization that one has violated one's 
own moral standard. The center of attention is the 
specific behavior, often some kind of harm done to someone 
or something (H. B. Lewis, 1971). The individual is 
convinced that he or she had some control over the event 
and could have prevented something bad from occurring. He 
or she feels responsible and motivated toward setting 
things right (Barrett, 1995; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Lindsay-
Hartz et al., 1995). Guilt functions to restore the bond 
between one's behavior and the expectations of society (H. 
B. Lewis, 1971). It guards against the destruction of 
group ties (Modell, 1971). Friedman (1985) proposed that 
guilt is a biologically based sensitivity and concern that 
derives from the need to maintain relationships, arising 
when one has somehow harmed or failed to help significant 
others. 
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Jones, Kugler, and Adams (1995) have suggested that 
guilt is particularly salient in the case of 
transgressions that threaten the status of relationships, 
as opposed to transgressions that do not involve 
relationships. At a state level, guilt serves the 
adaptive function of motivating altruistic and prosocial 
behavior and inhibiting aggression (Merisca & Bybee, 1996; 
Tangney, 1991; Zahn-Waxler & Kochanska, 1990; Zahn-Waxler, 
Kochanska, & Krupnick, 1990) by serving as a self-
inflicted punishment following transgressions (Baumeister, 
Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994 ) 
and reparation (Tangney, 1992) 
It motivates confession 
Baumeister et al. ( 1994) 
maintained that guilt is most effective in promoting 
prosocial behavior within close relationships. Guilt 
functions to strengthen these social relationships by (a) 
prompting behaviors such as concern, respect, and positive 
treatment of the other; (b) influencing more powerful 
persons to make concessions to less powerful persons; and 
(c) restoring emotional equity within a dyad after a 
transgression by decreasing the happiness of the 
transgressor, which may, in turn, soothe the feelings of 
the victim. 
According to Helen Block Lewis, guilt is "the 
relation of the self to transgression for which it is 
responsible" (1979b, p. 375). It is the feeling of 
discomfort that arises from attention given to how one's 
behavior violates normative standards. Guilt is a more 
objective experience than shame because it is about 
actions or thoughts for which one is responsible, rather 
than being about the self. In contrast to the passive 
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position of the self in shame, the self in guilt is 
actively engaged in the pursuit of making amends or 
thinking about the feeling of guilt. The person who feels 
guilty faces the difficulty of assessing the extent of his 
or her responsibility, determining what restitution is 
owed, and knowing when sufficient reparation has been 
made. Although guilt may be experienced as an 
uncomfortable state, the focus on specific, and presumably 
controllable, behaviors apart from the self leaves the 
self-concept and identity virtually intact (H. B. Lewis, 
1971) . 
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Guilt and Shame as Traits 
There are individual differences in the extent to 
which persons experience the states of guilt and shame. 
When guilt and shame are used consistently and extensively 
to interpret experience, they become the emotion traits of 
proneness to guilt, which can take the form of either 
ruminative or nonruminative guilt, and proneness to shame . 
Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that the 
choice of whether ruminative guilt, nonruminative guilt, 
or shame is evoked by a specific situation depends less on 
the characteristics of the situation than on the meaning 
assigned to the experience by the individual (H.B. Lewis, 
1971; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Tangney, 1992). According to 
one view, whether an emotion is adaptive or maladaptive 
depends upon how rationally the individual perceives the 
situation and the degree to which the emotion fosters 
personal development (Lindsay-Hartz et al., 1995). 
Limited empirical evidence suggests that women are more 
prone than men to report shame, ruminative guilt, and 
nonruminative guilt (Shiffler, 1993). 
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Trait of Shame 
Shame as a trait exists when the individual 
repeatedly experiences shame in response to a wide variety 
of situations. The person for whom shame is a personality 
trait almost continuously experiences the painful self-
denigration and the desire to withdraw or hide that occurs 
a s a result o f the belief that the entire self is 
def e ctive. Shame becomes maladaptive when it involves 
adherence to unrealistic ideals or promotes the view that 
inherent and unchangeable characteristics of the 
indi v idual are unacceptable (Lindsay-Hartz et al . , 1995). 
H. B. Lewis (1971, 1987) observed that a kind of 
humiliated fury, frequently directed against the self, may 
accompany the experience of shame as a trait, otherwise 
known as shame-proneness. She proposed that the greater 
value women place on interpersonal relationships makes 
them more vulnerable than men to the evaluation of others, 
and hence more prone to the emotion of shame. Because 
women in general are more sociable than men, they 
experience greater sadness and shame over social loss. 
Inasmuch as our culture tends to value sociability less 
than productivity, women may respond by devaluing their 
social selves, thus making themselves more vulnerable to 
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shame. In addition, H.B. Lewis saw women as more likely 
to direct their hostility inward because they are less 
aggressive than men . 
Trait of Guilt 
One o f the clear weaknesses in prior research on 
guilt- and shame-proneness is the focus on either 
ruminative guilt or nonruminative guilt, to the exclusion 
of the other. Researchers such as Tangney and her 
associates (Gramzow & Tangney, 1992; Tangney, 1989a, 
1989b, 1990, 1991; Tangney, Burggraf, Hamme, & Domingos, 
1988; Tangney, Burggraf, & Wagner, 1995; Tangney, Wagner, 
Fletcher, et al., 1992; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1989, 
1992) and M. Lewis (1992) have viewed guilt as serving 
primarily adaptive functions, ignoring the possibility 
that a guilt-prone orientation can serve the person 
maladaptively. Guilt--in either the state or the trait 
form--has been seen as motivating the individual toward 
action that redresses the wrong, and once the 
transgression has been repaired, the discomfort and guilty 
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affect dissipate. This is what actually occurs in the 
case of proneness to "nonruminative guilt" or "empathic 
guilt," which might also be described as a well-developed 
conscience. Tangney (1993) contended that any maladaptive 
tendencies related to guilt are due to an overlay of 
shame. 
In contrast, other researchers such as Harder and his 
associates (Harder, 1990, 1995; Harder et al., 1992; 
Harder & Lewis, 1987; Harder & Zalma, 1990) and Kugler and 
Jones (1992) have focused almost exclusively on 
"ruminative guilt" or "anxious guilt," in which the 
individual repeatedly accepts personal responsibility for 
negative events outside his or her control. In situations 
of actual wrongdoing, the offending individual believes 
that he or she can never do enough to properly atone for 
the wrongdoing. This leads to excessive rumination as the 
infraction, real or otherwise, is played out over and over 
again in the mind of the individual. Repeated efforts to 
make amends are never quite sufficient to rid the self of 
the nagging memories and the painful affect associated 
with the transgression. When the guilty individual is 
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unable to let go of self-reproach for the violation of a 
norm, feelings of guilt may be tied to inability to 
forgive the self. Guilt becomes ruminative, then, when it 
goes beyond appropriate redress, creating within the 
individual the sense that he or she should do more to make 
amends--even though nothing the individual does can ever 
bring relief from the feelings of guilt (Ferguson & 
Crowley, 1993). It is this "misplaced" responsibility--
the inaccurate belief that one is responsible for events 
or circumstances over which the individual has no control 
--that appears to be the hallmark of ruminative guilt 
(Ferguson, 1996; Ferguson et al., 1996; Friedman, 1985) 
Examples of ruminative guilt in the face of lack of 
control over the outcome of a situation include survivor 
guilt, separation guilt ( i.e., guilt over individuation), 
or guilt felt by persons who recognize that they have more 
of something than someone else (Modell, 1971). 
Lindsay-Hartz et al. (1995) observed that persons who 
experience unresolved guilt often attempt to restore the 
moral balance through self-punishment, extreme measures to 
avoid future transgression, engaging in symbolic 
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behaviors, trying to right the wrong, or an obsession with 
order. They may feel guilty in connection with future 
situations that do not merit guilt, or they may create 
situations that correspond with their feelings of guilt. 
According to this view, the likelihood of guilt-proneness 
is increased when an individual (a) habitually takes 
responsibility for preventing bad things from happening, 
(b) believes in his or her ability to control such bad 
things, (c) exhibits high levels of empathy, and (d) 
desires to honor personal and moral commitments. 
(1985) referred to psychopathology that contains 
Friedman 
ruminative guilt as "pathologies of loyalty" (p. 530) de 
Rivera (1989) proposed that nonruminative guilt is 
characterized by a focus on caring for the other (with 
one's own ego having less importance) . In contrast, 
ruminative guilt focuses on the self and is motivated by 
the fear of rejection or a defense against the recognition 
that unwanted events are outside one's control (with 
concern for the other having less importance). 
Although Helen Block Lewis did not directly address 
the issue of "ruminative guilt" per se, she referred to it 
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indirectly. She lumped simultaneously evoked guilt and 
shame under the category of guilt and said that in such 
cases, guilty ideation combines with the painful self-
reproach of shame (H. B. Lewis, 1971). According to this 
perspective, even after restitution has been made, shame 
functions to keep the guilty ideation alive. 
Guilt, Shame, and Psychopathology 
Theoretical Perspective: Guilt, Shame, and Pathology 
H. B. Lewis (1985) posited that mental illness is the 
result of failure to maintain ''our species' inherent 
sociability" (p. 151). When either shame or guilt goes 
unresolved, the result is symptom formation. The 
occasional experience of guilt or shame does not 
predispose the individual to psychopathology; rather, 
proneness to the emotions creates vulnerability to 
psychological symptoms (H. B. Lewis, 1971). 
H.B. Lewis (1979b) proposed that when shame is the 
predominant emotion, with the self as the helpless target 
of hostility, the result is depression. Tangney, Wagner, 
Fletcher, et al. (1992) expanded on the role of the 
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humiliated fury of shame in depression, stating that when 
the bitter, resentful anger of the shamed individual is 
suppressed, feelings of depression are the result. H. B. 
Lewis (1971, 1979b) also proposed that shame-proneness 
results in vulne rability to narcissism and conversion 
hysteria. On the other hand, guilt-proneness purportedly 
creates a vulnerability to thought-related disorders, such 
as paranoia and obsessive-compulsive disorder (H. B. 
Lewis, 1971, 1979b). 
Research Findings: Guilt, Shame, and Pathology 
A growing body of empirical evidence supports the 
notion that guilt- and shame-proneness are related to 
psychopathology and psychological symptoms. For example, 
Tangney, Wagner, and Gramzow (1992) found that general 
psychological maladjustment is strongly related to shame-
proneness. Contrary to the position of H. B. Lewis, 
shame-proneness relates more strongly than guilt-proneness 
to all indices of psychopathology employed in their study. 
It is important to note, however, that their measure of 
guilt- and shame-proneness utilizes a nonruminative 
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conceptualization of guilt. A summary of studies that 
examine specific types of psychopathology and 
psychological symptoms and their relationship to guilt and 
shame follows. 
Depression 
In what is probably the most robust and most 
frequently found relationship, shame-proneness has been 
positively correlated with depression and depressive 
symptomatology (e.g., r = .24 [with the variance 
associated with guilt statistically removed], Harder et 
al., 1992; r = .29 to .57, Hoblitzelle, 1987; r = .29, 
Shiffler, 1993; r = .32 to .51 [with the variance 
associated with guilt statistically removed]; Tangney, 
Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992; r = .49, Wright et al., 1989) 
Depression is also related to blaming one's character for 
negative events (r = .72, Peterson, Schwartz, & Seligman, 
1981), which might be construed as a manifestation of 
shame. 
In studies employing measures that tap a more 
ruminative conceptualization of guilt-proneness, guilt is 
related to clinical levels of depression (e.g., r = .40 to 
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.42, Jarrett & Weissenburger, 1990) and depressive 
symptomatology (e.g., r = .21 to .51 [with the variance 
associated with shame statistically removed], Hoblitzelle, 
1987; r = .37, Jones & Kugler, 1993; r= .26, Niler & 
Beck, 1989; r= .24, Shiffler, 1993; r= .18, Wright et 
al., 1989). It is important to note, however, that the 
authors who consider depression in relation to both guilt 
and shame find weaker correlations for guilt than for 
shame. Moreover, some of the measures of guilt do not 
adequately differentiate between guilt and shame (e.g., 
Niler & Beck, 1989). 
Narcissism 
Wright et al. (1989) found an inverse relationship 
between shame and narcissism (r= -.21). However, when 
Gramzow and Tangney (1992) considered healthy versus 
pathological aspects of narcissism, they found a positive 
relationship between shame-proneness (with the variance 
associated with guilt-proneness statistically removed) and 
pathological aspects of narcissism such as exploitation or 
a sense of entitlement (r = .13 to .18) and the defense of 
splitting (i.e., separation of good and bad images of the 
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self and others, r = .34 to .36). In contrast, shame-
proneness was inversely related to features of narcissism 
that the authors considered healthier, including 
leadership (r = -.36 to -.37), superiority (r = -.07 to 
-.09), and self-absorption (r = -.31 to -.32). They found 
no statistically significant relationships between 
narcissism and their nonruminative conceptualization of 
guilt-proneness. Wright et al. (1989) also found a 
positive relationship between their ruminative 
conceptualization of guilt and narcissism for men but not 
women (r = .29). In addition, men were more prone than 
women to narcissism (r < .05). 
Anger 
In two studies reported by Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, 
et al. (1992) , shame-proneness (with the variance 
associated with guilt-proneness statistically removed) was 
positively correlated with trait anger (r = .18 to .30), 
anger arousal (r = .12 to .24), suspiciousness (r = .38 to 
.39), resentment (r = .42 to .45), irritability (r = .30 
to .36), blaming others for negative events (r = .27 to 
.41), and indirect expressions of hostility (r = .17). 
Tangney, Wagner, and Gramzow (1992) also found 
hostility/anger to be related to shame (r = .13 to . 24). 
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In neither study was their nonruminative conceptualization 
of guilt related to indices of anger (r = -.05 to .03). 
Harder et al. (1992), using a ruminative 
conceptualization of guilt-proneness, found guilt-
proneness to be associated with anger (r = .28 [with the 
variance associated with shame-proneness statistically 
removed]), whereas the association between shame-proneness 
and anger (r = -.12) was lower and in the opposite 
direction. 
Other Pathologies 
In their aforementioned study of the relationship 
between guilt- and shame-proneness and psychopathology, 
Tangney, Wagner, and Gramzow (1992) found that shame-
proneness (with the variance associated with guilt 
statistically removed) was positively related to every 
measure of psychological symptoms that they employed. In 
each of the three studies they reported, nine 
psychological symptoms were considered. Only one of their 
27 correlations failed to achieve statistical significance 
at the p < .05 level, and 25 of the remaining 26 
correlations were significant at the p < .01 or p < .001 
level. In addition to depression and anger, the 
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psychological symptoms included somatization (r = .07 to 
.26), obsessive-compulsive behavior (r = .25 to .32), 
psychoticism (r = .22 to .32) , paranoia (r = .19 to .38), 
interpersonal sensitivity (r .36 to .49), anxiety (state 
and trait) (r = .18 to .29), and phobic anxiety (r = .23 
to .41). None of the relationships with their 
nonruminative conceptualization of guilt reached 
statistical significance. In addition, it was on the basis 
of very large sample sizes that many of their rather low 
correlations achieved statistical significance. 
Harder et al. (1992) found shame-proneness (with the 
variance associated with guilt statistically removed) to 
be positively related to obsessive-compulsive behavior (r 
= .38), interpersonal sensitivity (r = .29), psychoticism 
(r = .20), and phobic anxiety (r = .24) Their ruminative 
conceptualization of guilt-proneness is positively related 
to somaticization (r = .30), interpersonal sensitivity (r 
= .31), anxiety (r = .21), and psychoticism (r = 26). 
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Niler and Beck (1989) found guilt to be the best predictor 
of obsessional thoughts. Shame is positively related to 
neuroticism (r = .17 to .31, Johnson et al. [1987]; r = 
.17 to .35, Johnson, Kim, & Danko [1989]). 
Although not directly examining psychopathology, 
Jones and Kugler (1993) obtained correlations between a 
measure of guilty affect as a trait and various 
des c riptors of psychological and interpersonal 
functioning. They concluded that trait guilt is 
associated with difficulty initiating and maintaining 
satisfying relationships. 
Psychologically Healthy Behavior 
It is also useful to consider the relationship 
between the emotion constructs and the absence of 
psychopathology or psychological symptoms and the presence 
of prosocial behaviors. Such a relationship might be 
expected in the case of proneness to nonruminative guilt. 
In a study examining shame-proneness, a ruminative 
conceptualization of guilt-proneness, and empathic 
responsiveness, Tangney (1991) obtained a positive 
correlation between empathy and proneness to guilt 
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(r = .10 to .44, with the variance associated with shame-
proneness statistically removed). In contrast, self-
focused personal distress--a maladaptive, more self-
oriented index of empathic overarousal--is positively 
related to shame-proneness (r = .34). According to 
Merisca and Bybee (1996), guilt is associated with higher 
levels of volunteerism and interpersonal prosocial 
behavior and lower levels of aggressiveness and negative 
racial attitudes. Individuals higher in guilt are viewed 
as more caring , trustworthy, and thoughtful by associates. 
However, the guilt measure employed in their study (the 
Mosher Forced-Choice Guilt Scale, Mosher, 1966, 1968) may 
reflect moral standards more than guilt (Kugler & Jones, 
1992) . 
Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, et al. (1992) found that 
their nonruminative conceptualization of guilt-proneness, 
with the variance associated with shame statistically 
removed, has a negative relationship with blame of others 
(r = -.12 to -0.24), trait anger (r = -.01 to -.13), 
resentment (r = -.16 to -.21), hostility (r = -.15 to 
-.16), and suspiciousness (r = -.06 to -.12). In 
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addition, in their study of psychopathology, Tangney, 
Wagner, and Gramzow (1992) obtained negligible, and in 
many cases negative, correlations between guilt-proneness 
and all indices of psychopathology (r = -.17 to .11) 
It is important to note that because partial 
correlations have been employed in much of this research, 
it is unclear exactly what is being measured when the 
variance shared by the two constructs is removed. It is 
possible that guilt and shame, even in their purest forms, 
share certain important characterist ics and that in the 
effort to take a univariate approach in distinguishing 
between the two emotions, meaningful information is being 
lost. 
Implicit in the foregoing studies is the premise that 
guilt- and shame-proneness act as precursors to 
psychopathology, that they increase vulnerability to 
psychopathology, and that a causal relationship might 
exist. However, correlational results only indicate the 
existence of a relationship between the variables, and no 
longitudinal studies have been conducted to investigate 
the hypothesis that proneness to guilt and/or shame are 
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risk factors involved in the etiology of psychopathology. 
Measurement in Previous Research 
This section wi ll begin with a discussion of measures 
used in assessing proneness to guilt and shame. A 
historical overview of the measures used in earlier 
research will be provided, followed by a discussion of 
measures being employed in current research. Strengths 
and limitations of the measures will be described. 
Finally, a brief discussion of problems in the measurement 
of psychopathology in previous research on guilt and shame 
will be presented. 
Measurement of Guilt and Shame 
Measurement difficulties have plagued prior research 
on the relationship between guilt- and shame-proneness and 
psychopathology. The elusive nature of the guilt and 
shame constructs hampers their measurement, which is still 
in its infancy. Most measures to date have not reliably 
differentiated between the two emotions. This difficulty 
has, in part, reflected disagreement among researchers 
concerning definitions of the constructs. 
Historical Overview 
Assessment of guilt-proneness historically preceded 
attempts to assess shame-proneness. However, given the 
current definitions of guilt- and shame-proneness, older 
measures of guilt-proneness are incorrectly labeled 
inasmuch as they tap into features of both shame and 
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For example, Tangney and her colleagues (Tangney, 
1996; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992) have suggested 
that the Buss-Durkee Hostility Inventory (Buss & Durkee, 
1957), the G-Trait scale of the Perceived Guilt Index 
(Otterbacher & Munz, 1973), and Masher's (1966, 1968) 
Forced-Choice Guilt Inventory were developed without 
considering conceptual differences between shame and 
guilt. The Mosher Forced-Choice Guilt Inventory (1966, 
1968) also appears to contain items that tap moral 
standards rather than proneness to guilt (Kugler & Jones, 
1992; Tangney, 1996). Harder and Lewis (1987) found that 
the Mosher Total Guilt Scale lacks construct validity, 
especially for women. Finally, the Reaction Inventory--
Guilt (Evans, Jessup, & Hearn, 1975) is based on the 
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assumption that specific situations are likely to result 
in feelings of guilt. However, this measure is likely to 
confound guilt and shame because the choice of guilt or 
shame in reaction to an event is due more to the personal 
style of the individual than to the characteristics of the 
situation (H. B. Lewis, 1971; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; 
Tangney, 1992) . 
Older measures assessing both guilt- and shame-
proneness in a single instrument have not fared much 
better. Harder and Lewis (1987) examined the guilt and 
shame scales from the Beall Situational Upset Scale 
(Smith, 1972) and from the Gottschalk and Gleser (1969) 
coding system and found serious problems with psychometric 
soundness. Additionally, Tangney (1996) criticized 
Beall's measure for its assumption that different types of 
situations are either guilt-inducing or shame-inducing . 
Current Measures 
Authors of older instruments are not alone in their 
difficulties with operationalizing the concepts of guilt-
and shame-proneness. Problems with reliability and 
validity also plague data derived from some of the newer 
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guilt- and shame-proneness instruments. Still under 
question is whether the instruments clearly differentiate 
between the constructs and whether the methods of 
assessment actually tap into the emotions. Differences 
also exist in conceptual definitions of the two emotions 
upon which measures are based, especially in the case of 
guilt. In addition, a current debate in the literature 
addresses the merits of adjective-based measures versus 
situationally based measures . 
Situational Guilt Scale . Klass's (1987) Situational 
Guilt Scale is based on a number of so-called guilt -
inducing situations. However, in her recent review of 
measures of guilt- and /o r shame-proneness, Tangney (1996) 
crit icizes the measure for its failure to differentiate 
between guilt and shame. 
Guilt Inventory. The Trait Guilt Scale of the Kugler 
and Jones (1992) Guilt Inventory consists of 20 statements 
with which respondents indicate the magnitude of their 
agreement. Although Tangney (1996) praised the Guilt 
Inventory for the effort made to avoid confounding guilt 
with shame, she noted that it does contain a few items 
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reflective of shame. 
Internalized Shame Scale. Tangney (1996) criticized 
Cook's (1989) Internalized Shame Scale for problems with 
discriminant validity, stating that the measure confounds 
shame-proneness (an emotion) with self-esteem (a self-
evaluative construct). 
Dimensions of Conscious Questionnaire . The 
Dimensions of Conscious Questionnaire {Johnson et al., 
1987) is based on situations that are specifically coded 
as inducing either guilt or shame. However, because 
individuals might react to the same situation with either 
guilt or shame (Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Tangney, 1992), 
depending on their own emotional style, this measure 
appears to confound the two emotions. 
Adapted Shame and Guilt Scale (ASGS) In a recent 
study, Harder et al . (1992) examined the construct 
validity of several measures of guilt- and shame-
proneness. They correlated each guilt and shame measure 
with nine personality dimensions, whose predicted 
relationships with the emotions were theoretically 
determined. They concluded that a slightly modified 
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version of the shame scale from the Adapted Shame and 
Guilt Scale (Hoblitzelle, 1982, 1987; Harder & Zalma, 
1990) is the best instrument for the measurement of shame-
proneness. However, Tangney (1990, 1996) criticized 
checklist measures such as the ASGS on the grounds that 
they require the respondent to distinguish between the 
terms "guilt" and "shame" in an abstract context, which is 
a difficult task even for well-educated adults (Lindsay-
Hartz, 1984). Adjective checklists also require the 
individual to make global evaluations of the self's 
emotional experience, which Tangney and her associates 
(Tangney, 1990; Tangney et al . , 1995) contend is 
essentially a shame-related task. An additional 
limitation to the ASGS is its requirement that respondents 
be familiar with rather advanced vocabulary (Harder, 1995; 
Tangney, 1990, 1996). Tangney (1990) also noted that 
there is overlapping of the ASGS shame and guilt factors, 
indicating problems with divergent validity. 
Personal Feelings Ouestionnaire-2 (PFO2) According 
to Harder et al. (1992), the shame scale of the Personal 
Feelings Questionnaire-2 (PFQ2; Harder, 1990; Harder & 
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Lewis, 1987; Harder & Zalma, 1990; Harder et al., 1992) 
has only slightly less construct validity than the ASGS 
shame scale. They conclude that the PFQ2 may be a more 
appropriate measure of shame for subjects who may have 
trouble with the more complex vocabulary of the ASGS. The 
guilt scale of the PFQ2 appears to capture Caprara et 
al.' s (1992) "anxious guilt." Harder et al . (1992) found 
the PFQ2 guilt scale to be the one measure of guilt in 
their study that consistently demonstrates concurrent 
vali dity, although it has considera ble overlap with the 
shame scale. However , social desirability may severely 
limit the utility of data derived from such direct self-
report measures, because respondents may defensively deny 
the experience of emotions that they deem to be 
undesirable (Harder & Lewis, 1987). In addition, Tangney 
(1990) criticized the PFQ2 on the grounds that direct 
questions such as "Do you feel guilty?" depend on the 
ability of respondents to differentiate the meaning of the 
terms guilt and shame without any descriptors of related 
phenomenology. Research findings from both Tangney 
(1989b) and Lindsay-Hartz (1984) suggest that it is very 
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difficult for adults to differentiate and define guilt and 
shame in the abstract. Yet in other research by Tangney 
and her associates (Tangney, 1992; Tangney, Miller, 
Flicker, & Barlow, 1996), adult subjects who were asked to 
describe guilt and shame experiences were easily able to 
do so. Moreover, the guilt narratives and shame 
narratives clearly differed in terms of phenomenological 
and behavioral experience. Therefore, Tangney's criticism 
of adjective measures appears to be weakened by her own 
research. 
Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory 
(SCAAI). In an attempt to overcome the limitations of 
more direct measures and, thereby, obtain more valid 
assessment of proneness to shame and proneness to guilt, 
Tangney et al. (1988) developed the Self-Conscious Affect 
and Attribution Inventory (SCAAI) for use with a college-
student population. The SCAAI measures characteristic 
affective, cognitive, and behavioral responses associated 
with shame and nonruminative guilt. Respondents are asked 
to imagine themselves in each of 13 situations experienced 
by college students. Following each scenario, respondents 
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are presented with a list of responses, among which are a 
guilt response and a shame response for every scenario. 
Respondents rate each response according to their 
likelihood of responding in that manner. Tangney ( 1996) 
has contended that situation-based measures are especially 
appropriate for measuring guilt- and shame-proneness 
because they do not elicit feelings of shame about feeling 
guilty, because asking about respondents' feelings in 
specific situations rather than global tendencies is less 
likely to arouse defensive denial, and because they do not 
rely on the ability of respondents to differentiate 
between the terms "guilt" and "shame" in the abstract. 
The SCAAI yields data with acceptable reliability and 
validity. For example, Tangney (1991) obtained internal 
consistency estimates (Cronbach's alpha) that ranged from 
.74 to .82 for the shame scale and from .62 to .70 for the 
guilt scale. Test-retest reliability for the shame scale 
was .79. The shame subscale of the SCAAI correlated 
moderately with the shame subscale of Hoblitzelle's (1987) 
Revised Shame-Guilt Scale, whereas the guilt subscale of 
the SCAAI correlated moderately with the guilt subscale of 
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the Mosher (1966, 1968) Forced-Choice Guilt Inventory 
(Tangney, 1990). The SCAAI was not considered in the 
Harder et al. ( 1992) construct validation study. However, 
estimates of internal consistency reliability tend to be 
somewhat lower for scenario-based measures than for 
adjective checklist measures (Tangney, 1996). 
Additionally, Tangney's scenario-based measures of guilt 
may be assessing adherence to moral standards rather than 
a tendency to regularly experience the emotion of guilt 
(Fe rguson & Crowley, 1996; Kugler & Jones, 1992). 
Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA) Tangney et 
al . 's Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA; Tangney et 
al., 1989) was created in the same format as the SCAAI. 
It contains 15 "subject-generated" scenarios that have 
been found to yield data that are equivalent or superior 
to the SCAAI in terms of reliability and validity 
(Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992); internal consistency 
reliability was .66 for the TOSCA guilt scale and .76 for 
the shame scale. Harder et al. (1992) determined that the 
TOSCA shame scale has construct validity similar to the 
PFQ2 and suggested that its simpler vocabulary makes it 
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more appropriate than the ASGS for subjects with less 
education. However, the TOSCA was the only measure in the 
Harder et al. (1992) study to obtain highly statistically 
significant differences between the mean scores of male 
and female subjects. It is possible that these 
differences may be due to the tendency of women to self -
report more intense emotional experiences than do men in 
general (cf. Brody, 1996; Lafrance & Banaji, 1992; 
Shields, 1991), especially when they are asked directly 
about their emotional experience, when the emotion is 
observable, when the emotion occurs in an interpersonal 
context, and when global rather than situational 
emotionality is being assessed. An alternative 
possibility is that the TOSCA captures actual differences 
between men and women in proneness to the emotional 
experience of guilt and shame. 
An additional concern regarding the TOSCA is the 
theoretical conceptualization of guilt-proneness as an 
entirely positive, functional emotion, a reflection of 
Caprara et al. 's (1992) "empathic guilt." The Tangney et 
al. (1995) conceptualization suggested that guilt involves 
only the negative evaluation of specific action and that 
any ruminative response to feelings of guilt is an 
indication of shame. For example, the guilt response to 
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the TOSCA scenario in which a person unintentionally 
misses a lunch appointment with a friend is, "You would 
try to make it up to him as soon as possible . '' Clearly, 
this response reflects a behavioral response rather than 
negative self-feeling and taps into the more nonruminative 
components of guilt. Kugler and Jones (1992) have 
suggested that Tangney's measure is measuring moral 
standards rather than guilt per se. Harder (1995) 
criticizes Tangney's distinction between shame and guilt 
for being too narrowly focused on whether negative self-
evaluation originates in the global self or specific 
behavior. Harder et al. (1992) criticize the TOSCA as not 
measuring guilt well and resulting in very weak 
correlations with other guilt measures when the variance 
shared with shame is statistically removed. Other 
researchers (e.g., Malatesta & Wilson, 1988) have 
determined that any negative or positive emotion can serve 
the individual maladaptively, depending upon its 
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regularity of occurrence and appropriateness to the 
situation. The fact that guilt in excess can be 
maladaptive points to the limitations of Tangney's measure 
in assessing guilt-proneness in its ruminative form. 
Test of Self-Conscious Affect--Modified (TOSCA--M) 
In an attempt to capture both the ruminative and 
nonruminative (i..e., empathic and anxious) aspects of 
guilt, Ferguson and Crowley (1993) have modified the TOSCA 
by adding an additional response choice to each TOSCA 
scenario. These additional response items were generated 
to assess the respondent's level of ruminative guilt-
proneness, which is characterized by excessive rumination 
over the behavior and overcompensation for misdeeds. For 
example, the ruminative guilt response for the first 
scenario is, "You cannot apologize enough for forgetting 
the appointment." The ruminative guilt response implies 
that it is virtually impossible to make up for having 
missed the lunch appointment. Rather than providing for 
appropriate reparation, ruminative guilt is likely to 
result in the individual's obsessing over the misdeed. 
Crowley and Ferguson (1994) found the ruminative 
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guilt scale of the TOSCA--M to have internal consistency 
reliability (high .60s) equal to or greater than that of 
Tangney et al. 's (1989) original guilt scale (high .50s). 
Correlations between scores for the ruminative guilt scale 
and the TOSCA guilt and shame scales were positive (.60 
and high .60s, respectively) and of greater magnitude than 
the correlations between the scores for the original TOSCA 
guilt and shame scales (correlations not reported). 
Correlations between scores for the ruminative guilt scale 
and checklist measures of guilt and shame were low to 
moderate (low .20s and low . 30s, respectively), supporting 
the previous finding that the method of assessment 
markedly influences the magnitude of the relationship 
(e.g., Crowley & Anderson, 1993; Ferguson & Stegge, 1993) 
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the 
assessment of guilt- and shame-proneness continues to be a 
controversial endeavor, plagued by ongoing disagreement 
regarding the conceptualization and operationalization of 
the emotion constructs. 
55 
Measurement of Psychopathology 
Guilt and shame measures are not the only source of 
measurement difficulty in this body of research. Many 
measures of psychopathology are limited by the tendency of 
some test takers to give socially appropriate responses 
and others to respond with a pathological response set. 
Although some widely used measures such as the MMPI 
(Dahlstro m et al., 1989) have validity measures fashioned 
to detect a social desirability and pathological response 
sets, it is nevertheless impossible to prevent an 
individual from responding to these measures in a manner 
that exaggerates either social appropriateness or 
pathology. Many measures, such as the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI; Beck & Steer, 1987), lack validity scales 
and are thus subject to the problems of self-report 
measures (e.g., lack of reporting, response set). 
Especially in analogue research, subjects are frequently 
reluctant to reveal psychological difficulties. In these 
situations, an indirect measure of psychological 
functioning may be a more useful means of obtaining 
information. An additional difficulty is that most 
measures focus on pathology and lack indices of healthy 
functioning. As a result, few have scales that could 
intuitively be related to the nonruminative 
conceptualization of guilt. One measure that has the 
potential for overcoming these limitations is the 
Rorschach (Exner, 1993 ). 
The Rorschach: A Measure of 
Psychopathology 
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The Rorschach (Exner, 1993) is considered one of the 
top measures of psychological functioning. However, much 
controversy has historically surrounded the Rorschach, 
which in the past was interpreted using content analysis . 
How, it has been asked, can one's responses to a set of 
ambiguous inkblots tell us anything about that 
individual's psychological functioning? Is it not the 
subjective impression of the examiner that is reflected in 
interpretations of Rorschach responses? 
Most academics and many clinicians have depicted the 
MMPI as the "standard of psychological assessment" 
(Kendall & Norton-Ford, 1982, p. 310), while portraying 
the Rorschach as interesting but unscientific. In fact, 
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many concur with the statement of Jensen (1965): "The 
rate of scientific progress in clinical psychology might 
well be measured by the speed and thoroughness with which 
it gets over the Rorschach" (p. 238). Empirical evidence, 
however, contradicts this viewpoint. The results of meta-
analytic studies indicate that the psychometric properties 
of the Rorschach are adequate and roughly equivalent to 
those of the MMPI when the research is based on sound 
theoretical or empirical rationale (Atkinson, 1986; 
Parker, 1983; Parker, Hanson, & Hunsley, 1992). 
Questions of reliability and validity have been 
addressed by the comprehensive scoring and interpretation 
system of John E. Exner, Jr . (1993). With the use of a 
systematic scoring system, specific characteristics of 
Rorschach responses are scored in a consistent manner, 
providing the opportunity to compare the psychological 
functioning of the test taker with that of others who 
respond in a similar manner. According to Exner (1980), 
the Rorschach 
is a set of stimuli which, under a given 
instructional set, provoke into operation many of the 
"natural" psychological features of the individual 
that have formed or are forming; or stated 
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differently, it provokes the response tendencies or 
styles that will ultimately be among those features 
that mark the person as a personality. (pp. 573-574) 
The logic behind the Rorschach is that an individual's 
responses to ambiguous stimuli will be consistent with his 
or her accustomed manner of responding to the world in 
less precise situations, thus revealing the test taker's 
11 routine II psychology (Exner, 1980) . 
The Rorschach is an indirect means of obtaining 
information about the habitual perceptual-cognitive style, 
personality style, and psychopathology of the individual 
test taker. According to Weiner (1995a), the Rorschach 
measures both personality structure and personality 
dynamics. It examines many different aspects of 
personality, including 
(a) how people attend to, perceive, and think about 
events in their lives; (b) how they experience and 
express affect; (c) what attitudes they hold toward 
themselves, others, and interpersonal relationships; 
and (d) the nature and adequacy of their preferred 
style of coping with life situations and managing 
stress. (p. 330) 
In test-retest studies involving the reliability of 
the Rorschach (Exner, 1980), the greatest change occurred 
in scores that were influenced by current stressors, and 
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thus not expected to be consistent from one testing to the 
next. In contrast, those scores that reflected the 
individual's basic style of perceptual-cognitive 
operations remained relatively consistent (r = .64 to 
. 89) . Even when test takers were instructed in subsequent 
tests to give responses different from those in the 
original test, and the v erbiage of the two responses 
differed significantly, the scored characteristics of the 
new responses were remarkably similar to the original 
responses and tended to reveal the same psychological 
processes . Shontz and Green (1992) concluded that the 
Rorschach is psychometrically sound, with good reliability 
and validity when used properly. 
Rorschach scores are derived from several aspects of 
the response t o each inkblot, including the location of 
the blot area used in the response, the complexity of the 
response, the characteristics of the blot that led the 
respondent to give the response (e.g., form, color, 
shading), whether what the respondent reported can be 
easily perceived in the blot, the presence of a pair of 
objects or the perception of a reflection in the blot, the 
object(s) named and whether the response is the same as 
the most commonly given response, and how much cognitive 
60 
organization is required for the response. In addition, a 
number of special scores reflect specific characteristics 
of the response, such as illogical thinking, implausible 
relationships between objects, negativism, and a 
cooperative view of interpersonal relationships (Exner, 
1993) . 
Scores from all responses are summed, and from the 
summed scores a number of combined scores and ratios are 
derived in a structural summary of the test. Focusing on 
structural summary data rather than individual responses 
allows the examiner to obtain a composite drawing, as it 
were, of the respondent's overall psychological 
functioning, in addition to increasing reliability and 
validity over using individual test items (Weiner, 1995a) 
Several combined scores reveal the respondent's level of 
current and chronic stressors, his or her resources for 
dealing with stressors, and whether the respondent relies 
more on emotion or thought in problem solving. Other 
combined scores reveal specific characteristics of 
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affective functioning, interpersonal behavior, self-
perception, and three areas of cognitive functioning 
(i.e., information processing, mediation, and ideation) 
Specific psychological symptoms may be assessed by means 
of scores that reflect narcissism, anger, and dysphoric 
affect. In addition, various constellations of combined 
scores reveal the respondent's degree of suicide 
potential, depressive thinking, hypervigilance, 
obsessionality, deficient coping ability, and 
characteristics of schizophrenia such as paranoia (Exner, 
1993) . 
Construct Validity of the 
Rorschach Indices 
Past research has been conducted to examine the 
construct validity of many Rorschach indices. Selected 
research findings for some of the indices that are most 
salient to the present study are reported below. 
The depression index (DEPI) accurately identified 81% 
of depressed persons, with only 3% of nondepressed persons 
being incorrectly classified. The index is more precise 
in identifying individuals who exhibit the emotional and 
62 
cognitive aspects of depression, while it is less accurate 
with helpless depressions (Exner, 1993). 
Reflection responses are used as the measure of the 
degree of narcissism and self-centered presentation . 
Reflection responses to the Rorschach have been shown to 
have considerable temporal stability (Exner, 1993) 
The sum of the shading responses (including 
achromatic color responses) is used as an indicator of 
dysphoric affect or subjectively felt distress. Its 
values were higher in character disordered subjects and in 
seriously depressed subjects. The diffuse shading portion 
of the score is highly unstable and appears to relate to 
situational stress. Of the other contributors to the 
score, texture and vista are very stable and achromatic 
color has test-retest correlations ranging from the middle 
.60s to the middle .70s (Exner, 1993). 
The cooperative movement score (COP) is considered to 
be an indication of the degree to which respondents expect 
and experience positive interactions with other people. 
In a study of female college freshmen, individuals with 
higher COP scores were found to be more trustworthy and 
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liked by their peers (Exner, 1993). 
Texture responses (T) relate to the need for 
affection. An abnormally high need for affection was 
found in recently divorced or separated subjects, whereas 
an apparent abandonment of the need for affection was 
observed in foster-home children (Exner, 1993). 
Form dimensionality (FD) responses are related to 
positive self-inspection, unless they occur with greater 
than expected frequency. The number of FD responses tends 
to be greater in persons undergoing psychotherapy (Exner, 
1993) . 
The Rorschach is appropriate for guilt and shame 
research because it is useful in assessing the emotional 
style and self-concept of the respondent (Erdberg, 1990) 
The Rorschach yields a picture of the respondent that 
includes the presence or absence of psychological symptoms 
expected to coincide with proneness to shame and/or 
ruminative guilt (e.g., narcissism, depressive thinking, 
anger). In addition, several scores might be expected to 
correlate with a nonruminative, prosocial 
conceptualization of guilt (e.g., interpersonal 
cooperation, normal need for affection, positive self-
inspecting behaviors). But the major advantage of the 
Rorschach in this research is its ability to indirectly 
measure psychological functioning, thus avoiding the 
pitfalls of the social desirability response set that 
plagues most analogue research examining correlates of 
psychopathology. 
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It becomes clear from the foregoing review that the 
use of the Rorschach as a measure of psychopathology and 
psychological symptoms provides the potential to overcome 
many of the limitations of previous research on guilt and 
shame and answer questions that have been, up to now, 
answered only tentatively. 
Summary 
Ruminative guilt, nonruminative guilt, and shame are 
complex emotions that share certain phenomenological 
features while also being, in many respects, distinct in 
terms of both cognitions and the feeling experience. For 
individuals who consistently rely on one or more of these 
self-conscious emotions to organize and interpret 
experience, the emotions become personality traits. 
Limited empirical evidence exists to suggest that women 
are more prone than men to all three emotions. Recent 
attempts to measure proneness to shame, proneness to 
ruminative guilt, and proneness to nonruminative guilt 
have resulted in more conceptually and psychometrically 
sound instruments than those used historically. 
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Recent empirical evidence suggests that proneness to 
shame and/or ruminative guilt is associated with symptoms 
of various forms of psychopathology, whereas nonruminative 
guilt is associated with prosocial, altruistic functioning 
and a lack of pathological symptomatology. However, the 
conclusions of studies examining this issue are weakened 
by measurement issues, such as the failure to 
operationalize guilt and shame according to carefully 
circumscribed definitions, assessing guilt in a manner 
that evokes shame, and the lack of both ruminative and 
nonruminative conceptualizations of guilt. Moreover, most 
measures of psychopathology are limited by the reluctance 
of research participants to reveal potentially 
pathological aspects of themselves. 
The TOSCA--M (Tangney et al., 1989; revisions by 
Ferguson & Crowley, 1993) appears to measure ruminative 
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guilt-proneness, nonruminative guilt-proneness, and shame-
proneness as they are conceptualized in the present 
research . In addition, it measures guilt cleanly, without 
presenting respondents with a shame-inducing task. The 
Rorschach (Exner, 1993) indirectly measures psychological 
symptomatology at the same time that it assesses various 
facets of prosocial functioning, while avoiding the 
clouding effect of a defensive response set. 
CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
Subjects 
67 
Since the intent of the present research was to 
assess levels of guilt- and shame-proneness that exist in 
a normal, nonclinical population, the subjects for this 
study were male and female college students in 
introductory psychology classes at Utah State University. 
Because introductory psychology is a required course for 
students across the spectrum of college majors, students 
in introductory psychology classes at Utah State 
University are fairly representative of the USU population 
as a whole. Inasmuch as USU is unique as a rural 
university with a predominantly Mormon student body, this 
research attempted to replicate previous research results 
in other cultures in order to facilitate generalization to 
the college population as a whole. 
Utah State University is located in Logan, Cache 
County, Utah, a small rural community. According to 
recent U. S. Census figures (U. S. Department of Commerce, 
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1990), the median age of Cache County residents is 23.7 
years and 94.82% of the population is white. Statistics 
from the Bureau of Economic and Business Research at the 
University of Utah (1990) indicate that, in 1987, 32% of 
Cache County residents over age 25 had completed a high 
school education, and an additional 27.1% had completed at 
least four years of college. Per capita personal income 
for 1987 was $10,181. 
Research was conducted using preexisting data that 
were collected by Dr. Susan L . Crowley from members of 
introductory psychology classes at Utah State University 
from 1992 to 1994, plus additional data collected from 
members of introductory psychology classes from 1995 to 
1996. A total of 44 male and 48 female volunteer subjects 
participated. Data from one male subject was excluded 
from analyses due to language difficulties in completing 
the Rorschach. Table 1 presents basic demographic 
information for the sample, minus the excluded subject. 
Students were given extra credit for their participation. 
Institutional Review Board approval was obtained by Dr. 
Susan L. Crowley (see Appendix A), and data collection was 
Table 1 
Description of Subjects 
Subject Variable 
Age (SD) 
Range 
Race (%) 
White 
Hispanic 
Arabic 
Not reported 
Marital Status (%) 
Single 
Married 
Divorced 
Not reported 
Males 
(n - 43) 
21.29 ( 3. 07) 
18 to 31 
37 ( 86. 0) 
1 (2. 3) 
1 (2. 3) 
4 ( 9. 3) 
30 ( 69. 8) 
11 (25. 6) 
0 ( 0) 
2 (4. 7) 
Females 
(n - 48) 
19.50 (3. 24) 
17 to 35 
42 (87.5) 
1 ( 2. 1) 
0 (0) 
5 (10.4) 
38 (79. 2) 
6 (12. 5) 
1 (2 .1) 
3 ( 6. 3) 
conducted in accordance with American Psychological 
Association ethical guidelines for research with human 
subjects. 
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Procedure 
Students in the introductory psychology classes were 
informed by their instructors of the opportunity to earn 
extra credit for the class by completing two psychological 
measures outside of class time. They were assured that 
the information they divulged would remain anonymous. 
Volunteers completed an informed consent form (see 
Appendix B). Administration of the Rorschach (Exner, 
1993) was followed by the Test of Self-Conscious Affect--
Modified (TOSCA--M; Tangney et al., 1989; revisions by 
Ferguson & Crowley, 1993; see Appendix C). This order of 
administration was determined because the ambiguity of the 
Rorschach was unlikely to evoke feelings of guilt or shame 
in the respondent. On the other hand, feelings raised by 
administering the TOSCA--M first could conceivably have 
influenced Rorschach responses. The measures were 
administered by examiners who were blind to the purpose of 
the study. Standard instructions for both instruments 
were given. Demographic information (i.e., gender, age, 
race, marital status) was also collected. 
Standardized administration for the Rorschach has 
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been developed (Exner, 1993) and was followed. The 
Rorschach was administered to subjects by several 
different administrators who had completed a Rorschach 
course of training and who were judged by the course 
instructor t o be competent in Rorschach administration. 
The primary researcher did not administer the Rorschach to 
subjects. Scoring was completed by scorers who had 
c ompleted th e Rorschach course and who were judged by the 
instructor as competent in Rorschach scoring. The 
Ro rschach computer s co ring pr ogram was used to detect 
obvious scoring errors. Shadow scoring (i . e., a second 
sc o ring of Rorschach protocols ) was performed by the 
primary researcher on all of the Rorschachs, as 
rec ommended (Exner, 1991; Weiner, 1995a). Scoring 
disagreements were de c ided by the faculty member who 
teaches the Rorschach course. 
Criteria for exclusion of Rorschach protocols from 
data analysis included: (a) short protocols (i.e., less 
than 14 responses ) (Exner, 1993); (b) protocols with a 
number of responses involving sex, violence, or other 
bizarre content, combined with excellent form quality; (c) 
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errors of administration (e.g., failure to make 
appropriate inquiries); and (d) inadequate ability of the 
subject to respond to the Rorschach. Determination of the 
last three criteria was made by the primary researcher and 
a faculty member experienced with the Rorschach . One 
protocol was excluded from further consideration based on 
the respondent's difficulty with the English language. 
Measures 
Psychological Symptoms and Prosocial Tendencies 
The Rorschach (Exner, 1993) was used as the measure 
of psychological symptoms. The Rorschach is an indirect 
measure of the habitual perceptual-cognitive style, 
personality style, and psychological symptoms of the 
individual test taker. The test consists of 10 cards, 
each of which is imprinted with a standardized, 
symmetrical inkblot. Five of the inkblots are composed 
entirely of black ink, whereas two inkblots include some 
red ink along with the black. The remaining three 
inkblots are multicolored. Reliability and validity 
information for the Rorschach were reported in Chapter II, 
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in the Review of Literature. 
Because three of the Rorschach variables are treated 
as categorical variables and the other four as continuous 
variables in the present research, two types of analyses 
were required for answering each research question 
involving Rorschach variables. Therefore, a description 
of each variable and its status as a categorical or 
co ntinuous variable is in order. 
Categorical Rorschach Variables 
Depression. Depressive symptoms were assessed by 
means of the DEPI of the Rorschach. Interpretively, DEPI 
is a dichotomous variable that indicates the presence or 
absence of depression and should not be used otherwise. A 
DEPI score of 5 or higher (with a total of 7 possible) is 
indicative of possible depression. For purposes of this 
research, DEPI was coded as present (for scores ranging 
from 5 to 7) or not present (for scores below 5). Twenty-
one subjects, or 23% of subjects (12 males, 9 females), 
were positive on the DEPI. 
Need for affection. Need for affection was assessed 
using the texture responses on the Rorschach. Texture is 
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a categorical variable in which one response indicates an 
appropriate need for affection. A score of zero suggests 
that the subject is denying the natural need for 
affection, whereas two or more texture responses indicate 
excessive neediness for affection. Sixty-six percent of 
subjects (31 males, 29 females) did not give a texture 
response, whereas 24 subjects (26%; 11 males, 13 females) 
gave one texture response and 7 subjects (8%; 1 male, 6 
females) gave two or more texture responses. 
Self-inspection. Self-inspection was assessed by 
means of the form dimensionality responses on the 
Rorschach. A score of zero indicates a lack of positive 
self-inspection. One or two form dimensionality responses 
indicate that the individual engages in a typical level of 
positive self-inspection. More than two form 
dimensionality responses suggests that self-inspection may 
be excessive and may not be entirely positive. Half of 
the subjects (50%; 18 males, 28 females) gave one form 
dimensionality response, whereas 37 subjects (41%; 21 
males, 16 females) did not give a form dimensionality 
response and 8 subjects (8%; 4 males, 4 females) gave two 
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or more form dimensionality responses. 
Continuous Rorschach Variables 
Narcissism. Narcissism was measured by means of the 
number of Rorschach reflection responses. The presence of 
even one reflection response is considered indicative of 
narcissism. The range for this sample was zero to five 
reflection responses. 
Anger. Anger was assessed by means of the Rorschach 
white space responses. Because fewer than four white 
space responses are not considered problematic, zero to 
three white space responses were coded as zero for the 
purpose of analysis. Scores of four and above were coded 
according to their actual value. The range for this 
sample was Oto 11 white space responses. 
Dysphoric affect. Dysphoric affect was assessed by 
the Rorschach sum of shading variables (i.e., C', T, V, 
and Y). As the number of shading responses increases, the 
level of dysphoric affect is expected to increase. 
of three shading responses is expected in a normal 
A mode 
population. The range for this sample was Oto 17 shading 
responses. 
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Cooperation. The number of Rorschach COP responses 
was used as the measure of expectation of cooperation and 
positive interactions in relationships. A mode of two COP 
responses is expected in a normal population (Exner, 
1993). As the number of COP responses increases, 
cooperation and likability in relationships are expected 
to increase. The range for this sample was zero to four 
COP responses. 
Guilt- and Shame-Proneness 
The Test of Self-Conscious Affect--Modified (TOSCA--
M; Tangney et al., 1989; revisions by Ferguson & Crowley, 
1993) was employed as the measure of proneness to 
ruminative guilt, nonruminative guilt, and shame. The 
TOSCA--M is a paper-and-pencil measure that the subject 
completes independently. It consists of 15 brief 
scenarios characteristic of day-to-day life. For example, 
subjects are asked to respond to the following situation: 
''You make plans to meet a friend for lunch. At 5 o'clock, 
you realize you stood him up." Following each scenario, 
respondents are offered a number of empirically keyed 
responses, each of which they rate on a 5-point scale 
(where 1 represents ''not likely" and 5 represents "very 
likely") as t o their likelihood of responding in that 
manner. The responses to the 10 negatively valenced 
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scenarios indicate shame, ruminative guilt, nonruminative 
guilt, externalization of cause or blame, and 
detachment / unconcern. For example, the responses to the 
scenario presented above include: "You cannot apologize 
enough for forgetting the appointment" (ruminative guilt) 
"You would think, 'I'm inconsiderate'" (shame); "You would 
think: 'Well, he'll understand'" (detachment/unconcern); 
"You would try to make it up to him as soon as possible" 
(nonruminative guilt); and "You would think: 'My boss 
distracted me just before lunch'" (externalization) . 
Another of the scenarios states: "You make a mistake at 
work and find out a co-worker is blamed for the error." 
The nonruminative guilt response, which evidences an 
appropriate desire to set things right, is, "You would 
feel unhappy and eager to correct the situation." The 
ruminative guilt response, which suggests that nothing the 
person does can ever repay the debt, is, "You would feel 
horrified about what happened but afraid to correct the 
situation." The shame response, reflecting negative 
evaluation of the self, is, "You would keep quiet and 
avoid the co-worker." 
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The five positively valenced scenarios allow for the 
evaluation of guilt- and shame-proneness in instances of 
prosocial behavior. Responses indicate shame, ruminative 
guilt, nonruminative guilt, externalization, pride in the 
self, or pride in behavior. The measure is scored by 
summing the scores for each scale (e.g., shame, ruminative 
guilt) across scenarios. Scores for the shame, ruminative 
guilt, and nonruminative guilt scales range from 15 to 75, 
with a higher score representing greater proneness. 
Reliability and validity data for the TOSCA--M were 
reported in Chapter II, Review of Literature. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
The research questions in the present research 
include investigations of (a) gender differences in the 
levels of proneness to shame, ruminative guilt, and 
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nonruminative guilt; (b) gender differences in the levels 
of psychological symptoms, including depression, 
narcissism, anger, and dysphoric affect; (c) gender 
differences in the levels of prosocial tendencies, 
including positive interactions with other people, normal 
need for closeness, and positive self-inspection; (d) for 
males and females, the multivariate relationship between 
the Rorschach symptom variables and the TOSCA--M self-
conscious emotion variables; and (e) for males and 
females, the multivariate relationship between the 
Rorschach positive psychological functioning variables and 
the TOSCA--M emotion variables. 
Because statistical treatment of the categorical 
Rorschach variables differed from treatment of the 
continuous Rorschach variables, it was not always possible 
to examine the groups of positive functioning variables 
separately from the negative functioning variables, and 
vice versa. Therefore, in many of the following 
descriptions of statistical analyses, variables are 
grouped according to their statistical treatment status. 
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The results of the present study are divided into 
sections that include preliminary analyses of the internal 
consistency reliability o f the sample data, tests for 
gender differences, and analyses to determine the 
relationships between the emotion variables and the 
psychological functioning variables. Most of the 
statistical tests did not yield significant differences. 
However, in view of increasing skepticism about the value 
of tests of statistical significance (Carver, 1978, 1993; 
Shaver, 1993), R-squared values and other measures of 
effect size are reported in order to reveal the magnitude 
of the detected differences and relationships among the 
variables. 
Preliminary Analyses 
Because reliability is not inherent in an instrument 
itself, but is rather a feature of the data in hand, 
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preliminary analyses were conducted to determine the 
internal consistency reliability (Cronbach's alpha) of the 
Shame-Proneness, Ruminative Guilt-Proneness, and 
Nonruminative Guilt-Proneness scales of the Test of Self-
Conscio us Affect--Modified. The results of these analyses 
are presented in Table 2. Acceptable levels of 
reliability were observed for each of the scales, ranging 
from .62 for Nonruminative Guilt to .83 for Ruminative 
Guilt. Because these levels are consistent with those 
previously reported for the TOSCA--M, further data 
analysis is appropriate. 
Table 2 
Internal Consist-ency Reliability of the TOSCA---M Scales 
(Cronbach 's Alpha) 
Emotion 
Nonruminative Guilt 
Ruminative Guilt 
Shame 
59.55 
48.53 
44.06 
6.05 
9.23 
10.26 
Alpha 
.62 
.83 
.78 
Gender Differences in the Research Variables 
Gender Differences in the Self-Conscious Emotions 
Gender differences in proneness to the emotions of 
ruminative guilt, nonruminative guilt, and shame were 
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investigated by conducting a two-group MANOVA to determine 
whether differences exist between the mean scores of males 
and females on the three self-conscious emotions. The 
null hypothesis of no difference was rejected (Wilks' 
Lambda= .77, F = 8.74, R < .0005). Wilks' Lambda, which 
is conceptually equal to 1 minus R2 , is used as the 
multivariate effect size (Xitao Fan, personal 
communication, November 18, 1996). Smaller Wilks' Lambda 
values are indicative of a larger effect size. Using the 
formula given above yields an R2 value of .23, or 23% of 
the variance accounted for. 
The results of follow-up univariate tests of 
statistical significance are presented in Table 3. The 
follow-up tests revealed statistically significant 
differences on all three emotions, with females scoring 
higher than males on ruminative guilt, nonruminative 
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Table 3 
Gender Differences in the Self-Conscious Emotions 
Mean (SD) 
Emotion Males Females p SMD 
Nonruminative guilt 57.23 (5. 69) 61.72 (5.60) .0005 .74 
Ruminative guilt 44 . 40 (7. 43) 52.32 (9.16) .0005 .86 
Shame 40.00 (8. 31) 47.77 (10.55) .0005 .76 
guilt, and shame. Standardized mean difference (SMD) 
effect sizes, which are not dependent upon sample size, 
were obtained for all three variables. SMDs were 
calculated by dividing the difference of the two means by 
the pooled standard deviation. Although a certain amount 
of ambiguity exists in the interpretation of univariate 
effect sizes, Stevens (1990) has suggested that effect 
sizes of .2 be considered small, .5 as medium, and greater 
than .8 as large. Therefore, the effect sizes obtained in 
this analysis were moderate to large. 
Gender Differences in Psychological Functioning 
The question concerning the existence of gender 
differences in psychological functioning was investigated 
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by conducting separate tests of statistical significance 
for the categorical and continuous Rorschach variables. 
Chi-square tests were conducted for the three categorical 
variables. No statistically significant gender 
differences were detected for depression (Pearson chi-
square= 1.07, p .30), need for affection (Pearson chi-
square= 3.54, p = .17), or self-inspection (Pearson chi-
square= 2.58, p = .27). 
A two-group MANOVA was conducted to investigate 
gender differences in the four continuous Rorschach 
measures of psychological functioning. The null 
hypothesis of no statistically significant difference was 
rejected (Wilks' Lambda= .86, F = 3.48, df = 1,42, p = 
. 01). Using Wilks' Lambda as the multivariate effect 
size, an R2 value of .14 was obtained. Follow-up 
univariate tests of statistical significance were employed 
to determine which variables accounted for the 
differences. The results of the univariate tests are 
presented in Table 4. A statistically significant 
difference between males and females was found for 
narcissism, on which males scored significantly higher 
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Table 4 
Gender Differences in the Continuous Rorschach Variables 
Variable 
Cooperation 
Narcissism 
Anger 
Mean (SD) 
Males 
.88 (1.10) 
1.14 (1.39) 
3.93 (2.62) 
Females 
Dysphoric affect 3.35 (3.51) 
1.23 (1.06) 
.46 (.71) 
3.13 (2.27) 
3.33 (2.64) 
.13 
.004 
.29 
.98 
.32 
.87 
.33 
.01 
than females. A large SMD effect size of .87 was 
obtained. No other statistically significant differences 
were detected among the continuous Rorschach variables, 
and the other effect sizes were comparatively small, 
ranging from .01 to .33. 
Relationships Between the Self-Conscious Emotions 
and Psychological Functioning 
In addition to examining gender differences in the 
levels of each of the variables, this research also 
addresses the relationship between proneness to the self-
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conscious emotions of ruminative guilt, nonruminative 
guilt, and shame and the seven Rorschach psychological 
functioning variables. The bivariate relationships among 
the variables are considered, followed by an examination 
of the multivariate relationships between the emotion 
variables and the psychological functioning variables. 
Bivariate Relationships Among the Variables 
Although the focus of this research is on the 
multivariate relationships among the variables, bivariate 
correlations among the self-conscious emotion variables 
and the psychological functioning variables were computed 
for the entire sample and separately for males and 
females. They are offered here as essentially preliminary 
analyses. For analyses in which both scores are 
continuous variables, Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficients are reported. Spearman rank correlation 
coefficients are reported for analyses in which one or 
both variables are categorical variables. 
Total Sample 
Table 5 presents the correlations based on the total 
Table 5 
Correlations (and Probabilities) for the Entire Sample Among the Emotion Variables 
and the Psychological Functioning Variables 
Nonruminative Ruminative 
Va riable guilt 
Nonruminative 1.00 
guilt 
Ruminative 
guilt 
Shame 
Depression 
Narcissism 
Anger 
Dysphoric 
affect 
Need for 
affection 
Self-
inspection 
Cooperation 
.41. 
(< 0005) 
.30 
(. 004) 
-.15 
( . 17 ) 
.08 
(. 47) 
-.08 
( . 44) 
- .0 4 
(. 69) 
.13 
(. 22) 
. 03 
( . 79) 
. 21 
(. 05) 
guilt 
1.00 
. 79 
(<.0005) 
-.22 
(. 03) 
-.02 
(. 88) 
- .15 
( .15) 
-.05 
(. 61) 
.37 
(<.0005) 
. 03 
(. 79) 
. 17 
(. 10) 
Shame 
1.00 
- .15 
( .14) 
-.06 
(. 58) 
-.10 
(. 33) 
-.01 
(. 93) 
.35 
(. 001) 
.10 
(. 36) 
.14 
( .19) 
Depression Narcissism 
1.00 
-. 05 
(. 66) 
.43 
(< . 0005) 
. 42 
(<.0005) 
- .14 
( . 19 ) 
.12 
(. 26) 
-.05 
(. 61) 
1.00 
.14 
(. 20) 
.13 
(. 22) 
- . 14 
( .18) 
- . 07 
(. 49) 
.02 
(. 84) 
Anger 
1.00 
.48 
(<.0005) 
- . 01 
(. 90) 
.25 
(.02) 
.18 
(. 08) 
Dysphoric 
affect 
1.00 
.36 
(. 001) 
.25 
(. 02) 
-.00 
(. 99) 
Need for 
affection 
1.00 
.22 
(. 04) 
.16 
( .13) 
Self-
inspection 
1.00 
.18 
(. 10) 
Cooperation 
1.00 
n 91 . Spearman rank correlation coefficients are reported in italics. All others are Pearson product-moment correlations. 
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sample among the self-conscious emotions and the 
psychological functioning variables. Correlations are 
generally small to moderate, and only those correlations 
of .20 or above will be discussed. Nonruminative guilt 
has a small correlation with cooperation (r = . 21). 
Ruminative guilt correlates negatively with depression (r 
= - . 22) and correlates moderately in a positive direction 
with need for affection (r = .37). Shame also correlates 
moderately with need for affection (r = .37). 
Gender Differences 
Separate correlations for males and females were 
calculated and are reported in Table 6. As with the total 
sample, correlations are small to moderate. A number of 
interesting differences appeared between men and women in 
the patterns of correlations between the emotion variables 
and the psychological functioning variables. 
Depression correlated negatively with all three 
emotion variables for both males and females. However, 
for males the strongest relationship was with ruminative 
guilt (r = -.28), whereas for females the strongest 
relationship was with shame (r = -.20). 
Table 6 
Correlations (and Probabilities) for Males and Females Among the Emotion Variables 
and the Psychological Functioning Variables 
Variable 
Nonruminative 
guilt 
Ruminative 
guilt 
Shame 
Depression 
Narcissism 
Anger 
Dysphoric 
affect 
Need for 
affection 
Self-
inspection 
Cooperation 
Nonruminative Ruminative 
guilt 
.38 
(. 01) 
.32 
( .04) 
-.07 
( . 65) 
.36 
(. 02) 
.OS 
(. 74) 
. 10 
(. 51) 
.12 
(. 45) 
-.02 
(. 92) 
-.03 
(. 83) 
guilt 
.24 
( .11) 
.73 
(< .0005) 
-.28 
(. 07) 
.33 
(. 03) 
-.01 
(. 97) 
.03 
(.83) 
.38 
(. 01) 
.16 
(. 29) 
.20 
( . 19) 
Note. Correlations for females (n 
Shame 
.09 
(. 53) 
.76 
(<.0005) 
-.05 
(. 74) 
.20 
(. 20) 
.02 
(. 92) 
. 14 
(. 36) 
.37 
(. 01) 
.14 
(. 36) 
.11 
(. 48) 
Depression 
-. 11 
( . 45) 
-.14 
(. 33) 
- . 20 
(. 16) 
- . 03 
(. 87) 
.48 
(. 001) 
. 54 
(<.0005) 
-.05 
(. 76) 
-.06 
(. 71) 
. 07 
(. 67) 
Narcissism 
-.02 
( . 91) 
- .12 
(. 42) 
- .12 
(. 40) 
-.14 
(. 35 I 
. 18 
(. 26) 
.18 
(. 25) 
- . 01 
(. 95) 
.11 
(. 48 I 
.12 
(. 44 ) 
Anger 
-.15 
(. 31) 
-.22 
( .14) 
- . 14 
(. 35) 
.36 
(. 01) 
-.02 
(. 91) 
. 53 
(< .0 005) 
-.04 
(. 78) 
. 33 
(. 03) 
. 3 8 
(. 01) 
Dysphoric 
affec t 
-.23 
(. 12) 
-.15 
(. 30) 
-. 15 
( .31) 
.27 
(. 07) 
.04 
(. 78) 
. 48 
(<. 0005) 
.22 
(. 16) 
.25 
( .11) 
-.12 
( . 45) 
Need for 
affection 
.0 5 
(. 72) 
.32 
(. 03) 
.23 
( . 12) 
-.19 
(. 19) 
- . 20 
( . 18) 
. 04 
(. 80) 
.50 
(<. 0005) 
. 36 
(. 02) 
. 08 
(.63) 
Self-
inspection 
-.04 
(. 80) 
- .19 
(. 20) 
-.05 
(. 74) 
.35 
(. 01) 
- . 22 
( .14) 
.19 
( .19) 
.23 
( .12) 
. 08 
(. 59) 
.06 
( . 72) 
Cooperation 
.36 
(. 01) 
.06 
(. 70) 
.07 
(. 63) 
-.09 
(. 54) 
.02 
(.84) 
. 18 
(. 08) 
-.00 
(. 99) 
.23 
(.12) 
.21 
( .14) 
48) are above the diagonal. Correlations for males (n = 43) are below the diagonal. 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients are reported in italics. All others are Pearson product-moment correlations . 
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For the males, narcissism correlates moderately 
with nonruminative guilt (x = .36) and ruminative guilt 
(x = .33) and has a smaller correlation with shame (x = 
. 20) . In contrast, the correlations for females between 
narcissism and the self-conscious emotions are 
negligible (x = -.02 to - . 12). 
Whereas males' correlations between anger and the 
emotion variables are negligible (r -.01 to .05), the 
correlations for females are all in a negative 
direction, with the strongest correlation being between 
anger and ruminative guilt (x = -.22). The same pattern 
is observed for dysphoric affect, where correlations for 
males are very small and positive (x = .03 to .14), 
whereas the small correlations of females are all in a 
negative direction, with the strongest correlation being 
between dysphoric affect and nonruminative guilt (x = 
- . 23) . 
Males and females differ considerably in the 
correlations between the emotion variables and 
cooperation. For females, cooperation correlates 
moderately with nonruminative guilt for females (x 
.36) but negligibly for males (r = -.03). In contrast, 
the cooperation of males has a small correlation with 
ruminative guilt (r = .20), compared to females' 
negligible correlation (r = .06). 
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One correlational relationship revealed a similar 
pattern for males and females. The need for affection 
of both males and females is positively associated with 
ruminative guilt (r = . 38 and r = .32, respectively) and 
with shame (r = .37 and r = .23, respectively). 
Multivariate Relationships Among the Variables 
The focus of this research is the multivariate 
relationships among the three self-conscious emotions 
and the seven Rorschach psychological functioning 
variables. The multivariate framework was chosen 
because it is more powerful and better honors the 
reality of multiply interacting variables (Pedhauzer, 
1982) . In the multivariate analyses, as in previous 
analyses, the specific analysis employed depended upon 
whether the Rorschach psychological functioning 
variables under question were categorical or continuous 
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variables. Each analysis was completed first on the 
total sample, and then males and females were considered 
separately. 
The categorical Rorschach variables (i.e., 
depression, need for affection, self-inspection) were 
each considered separately, by means of discriminant 
function analysis, to examine the relative relationship 
of each emotion variable with the individual Rorschach 
psychological functioning variables. The four 
continuous Rorschach variables (i.e., narcissism, anger, 
dysphoric affect, cooperation) were subjected to 
canonical correlation analyses, with the three emotion 
variables comprising the second set of variables. 
Results of the discriminant function analyses will be 
presented first, followed by results of the canonical 
correlation analyses. As is common practice in 
methodological literature, most attention will be paid 
to those results in which at least 10% of the variance 
in the psychological functioning variable(s) is 
accounted for by the relationship with the emotion 
variables (Pedhauzer, 1982). 
Discriminant Function Analyses 
Depression. Discriminant function analysis was 
employed to determine the relative association of each 
of the three emotion variables with the presence or 
absence of depression, as measured by the DEPI. The 
direct entry method, which considers all of the 
variables simultaneously, was used. The resulting 
discriminant function accounts for only 6% of the 
variance (Wilks' Lambda= .94, p = . 16, R2 = .06) and 
thus will not be interpreted. 
Discriminant function analyses predicting the 
presence or absence of depression were conducted 
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separately for males and females. The resulting 
discriminant function for males, presented in Table 7, 
accounts for 15% of the variance (Wilks' Lambda= .85, p 
= .08, R2 = .15). The results of the discriminant 
analysis include the structure coefficients (i.e., the 
pooled-within-groups correlation between the variable 
and the discriminant function) and the standardized 
function coefficients (i.e., Beta weights) for each of 
the emotion variables. Using a structure coefficient 
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Table 7 
Discriminant Function Predicting Depression in Males 
Emotion 
Function 
Coefficient 
Structure 
Coefficient 
Nonruminative guilt -.16 .13 
Ruminative guilt 1.53 .74 
Shame -.98 .12 
cutoff of . 3 (Pedhauzer, 1982), ruminative guilt appears 
to relate most strongly to depression in males. 
Nonruminative guilt and shame contribute little to an 
understanding of depression in males. 
The results for females yielded one discriminant 
function that accounts for only 4% of the variance 
(Wilks' Lambda= .96, p = .58, R2 = .04). It will not, 
therefore, be interpreted. 
Need for affection. Discriminant function 
analysis, using the direct entry method, was employed to 
determine the relative relationship of the three emotion 
variables with need for affection (i.e., texture). One 
discriminant function accounting for 15% of the variance 
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was identified (Wilks' Lambda= .83, p < .01, R2 = .15) 
and is presented in Table 8. Examination of the 
structure coefficients of the function suggests that 
ruminative guilt and shame play an important role in 
discriminating between the levels of need for affection, 
whereas nonruminative guilt contributes little to an 
understanding of need for affection . A second 
dis c riminant function was also identified (Wilks' Lambda 
= . 97, p < .25, R2 = . 03 ). However, it accounts for 
only 3% o f the variance and will be not be discussed 
furth e r. 
Separate discriminant function analyses using the 
Table 8 
Discriminant Functions Differentiating Levels of Need 
for Affection for the Total Sample 
Emotion 
Nonruminative guilt 
Ruminative guilt 
Shame 
Function 
Coefficient 
-.14 
.80 
.30 
Structure 
Coefficient 
.27 
.97 
.86 
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three emotion variables to predict the level of need for 
affection were conducted for males and females. Each 
analysis yielded one function that accounts for 19% of 
the variance (Males: Wilks' Lambda= .77, p = .12, R2 = 
.19; Females: Wilks' Lambda= .78, p = .09, R2 = .19) . 
Structure and function coefficients for the discriminant 
functions for males and females are presented in Table 
9. The results for males suggest that the level of 
shame may be the most important self-conscious emotion 
in predicting males' need for affection, together with 
lower levels of ruminative guilt. In contrast, females' 
need for affection is more likely to be related to 
higher levels of ruminative guilt, with shame playing a 
secondary role. A second discriminant function for each 
gender accounts for only 5% of the variance for males 
and 3% for females (Males: Wilks' Lambda= .95, p = .39, 
R2 = .05; Females: Wilks' Lambda= .97, p = .48, R2 
.03 ) and will not be further discussed. 
Self-inspection. The direct entry method of 
discriminant function analysis was employed to determine 
the relative association of each of the three emotion 
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Table 9 
Discriminant Functions Differentiating Levels of Need 
for Affection for Males and Females 
Emotion 
Males 
Nonruminative guilt 
Ruminative guilt 
Shame 
Females 
Nonruminative guilt 
Ruminative guilt 
Shame 
Function 
Coefficient 
-.16 
- .0 1 
1.05 
-.48 
1.10 
-.10 
Structure 
Coefficient 
.17 
.66 
.99 
-.17 
.89 
.65 
variables with the level of self-inspection (i.e., form 
dimensionality) . The resulting discriminant function 
accounts for only 2% of the variance (Wilks' Lambda= 
.97, 12 = .85, R2 = .02). It will, therefore, not be 
interpreted. 
Separate discriminant function analyses were 
conducted for males and females in order to detect any 
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<gender differences in the relationship between self-
inspection and the three self-conscious emotions. The 
<discriminant function for males accounts for only 3% of 
the variance (Wilks' Lambda= .94, p = .90, R2 = .03) 
IHowever, the discriminant function for females accounts 
for 12% of the variance (Wilks' Lambda= .88, p = .47, 
R 2 = .12) and is presented in Table 10. Nonruminative 
guilt appears to be the major self-conscious emotion in 
the self-inspection of females. However, the near-zero 
( -.04) structure coefficient for shame, coupled with a 
much higher function coefficient (-1.32), suggests that 
shame was operating as a suppressor effect. In other 
Table 10 
Discriminant Function Predicting Self-Inspection in 
Females 
Emotion 
Nonruminative guilt 
Ruminative guilt 
Shame 
Function 
Coefficient 
-.08 
1 . 64 
-1.32 
Structure 
Coefficient 
.58 
.17 
-.04 
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words, although shame directly adds almost nothing to 
the relationship with self-inspection, it indirectly 
improves the relationship of nonruminative guilt to 
self-inspection by removing its shared variance with 
nonruminative guilt. A second discriminant function for 
females that accounts for only .4% of the variance was 
identified (Wilks' Lambda= .99, p = .92, R2 = .004) but 
will not be discussed further. 
Canonical Correlation Analyses 
The four continuous Rorschach variables were 
examined for their relationship with the three self-
conscious emotion variables by means of canonical 
corre lation analyses. The first set of variables was 
composed of the three self-conscious emotions, 
nonruminative guilt-proneness, ruminative guilt-
proneness, and shame-proneness. The second set of 
variables was composed of the four continuous Rorschach 
variables (i.e., cooperation [COP], narcissism 
[reflection], anger [white space], and dysphoric affect 
[sum of shading]). Data were analyzed for the total 
sample, followed by separate analyses by gender. 
Total sample. Considering all 91 subjects, a 
canonical function accounting for only 9% of the 
variance was identified (Wilks' Lambda= .89, p = .62, 
. 09) It will not be interpreted . 
Gender differences. The canonical correlation 
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analysis was repeated separately for males and females. 
The first canonical function for each gender accounts 
for 19% of the variance for males and 23% of the 
variance for females (Males: Wilks' Lambda= .72, p = 
. 43, R2 = .19; Females: Wilks' Lambda= .72, p = .33, R2 
= . 23) . The canonical function for males, together with 
its structure and function coefficients, is presented in 
Table 11. The table presents the loadings or structure 
coefficients (i.e. , correlation between each variable 
and its canonical variate) and function coefficients 
(i.e ., standardized canonical coefficients) that are 
used to interpret the pair of canonical variates for the 
canonical correlation. 
Examination of the structure coefficients suggests 
that, for males, ruminative guilt and nonruminative 
guilt are the most important emotions in the 
101 
Table 11 
Canonical Functions for Males Relating the Emotion 
Variables and the Continuous Rorschach Variables 
Variables 
Function 
Coefficients 
Structure 
Coefficients 
Self-Conscious Emotion 
Nonruminative guilt -.48 -.74 
Ruminative guilt -.85 -.89 
Shame .21 -.57 
Rorschach Variable 
Narcissism -.94 -.95 
Anger .35 -.04 
Dysphoric affect -.17 -.11 
Cooperation -.35 -.31 
multivariate relationship between the two sets of 
variables. Shame appears to play an important but 
secondary role in understanding the relationship. Among 
the psychological functioning variables, only narcissism 
loads strongly, with cooperation playing a very minor 
role. It appears, therefore, that the narcissism of 
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men, and to a lesser extent their cooperation in 
relationships, are characterized by the presence of all 
three emotion variables, but especially by ruminative 
guilt. 
The canonical function for females is presented in 
Table 12. Nonruminative guilt is the strongest emotion 
Table 12 
Canonical Functions for Females Relating the Emotion 
Variables and the Continuous Rorschach Variables 
Variables 
Self-Conscious Emotion 
Nonruminative guilt 
Ruminative guilt 
Shame 
Rorschach Variable 
Narcissism 
Anger 
Dysphoric affect 
Cooperation 
Function 
Coefficients 
.96 
-.19 
.43 
-.07 
-.09 
-.61 
.85 
Structure 
Coefficients 
.95 
.36 
.37 
-.10 
-.33 
-.53 
.75 
in the relationship between the two sets of variables. 
Among the psychological functioning variables, 
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cooperation has the strongest relationship. Dysphoric 
affect, and to a lesser degree anger, appear to be 
important to the relationship, but in a negative 
direction. It appears, therefore, that nonruminative 
guilt in women is associated with high levels of 
cooperation in relationships and the absence of 
dysphoric affect and anger. 
Follow-up analyses. Because cooperation, which is 
a positive psychological functioning variable, dominates 
the canonical correlations in which a considerable 
percentage of the variance is accounted for, its 
presence in the analyses may have obscured some of the 
relationships between the emotion variables and the 
remaining continuous Rorschach variables, all of which 
are considered indicative of negative psychological 
functioning. In order to more clearly identify the 
multivariate relationship between the three negative 
Rorschach variables and the emotion variables, follow-up 
canonical correlation analyses were conducted from which 
cooperation was excluded. 
For the total sample, a canonical correlation 
accounting for only 3% of the variance was identified 
(Wilks' Lambda= .96, p = .93, R2 = .03). 
be discussed further. 
It will not 
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Gender differences were also examined. For males, 
one ca nonical function accounting for 18% of the 
variance was identified (Wilks' Lambda= . 79 , p = . 42, 
R2 = .18) and is reported in Table 13. For the females, 
the resulting canonical function accounts for only 9% of 
the variance (Wilks' Lambda= .88, p = .80, R2 = .09) 
and will not be interpreted. 
For males, examination of the structure 
coefficients indicates that both nonruminative guilt and 
ruminative guilt are important emotions that contribute 
to an understanding of the relationship between the two 
sets of variables. Shame appears to have a lesser but 
important role. Among the psychological functioning 
variables, only narcissism appears to make an important 
contribution to the relationship. It seems, therefore, 
that the narcissism of males occurs in the presence of 
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Table 13 
Canonical Functions for Males Relating the Emotion 
Variables and the Negative Continuous Rorschach 
Variables 
Variables 
Function 
Coefficients 
Structure 
Coefficients 
Self-Conscious Emotion 
Nonruminative guilt -.65 -.85 
Ruminative guilt -.72 - . 79 
Shame .25 -.48 
Rorschach Variable 
Narcissism -1.01 -.99 
Anger .12 -.06 
Dysphoric affect -.02 -.14 
ruminative guilt, nonruminative guilt and, to a lesser 
degree, shame. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
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The major questions posed in the present research 
concern the multivariate relationships between measures of 
the three self-conscious emotion variables and seven 
Rorschach psychological functioning variables. The 
research also considers gender differences in the emotion 
and psychological functioning variables and in 
relationships among the variables. The following 
discussion will begin with a brief overview of the 
results. The results will then be discussed and 
interpreted in greater detail, including a discussion of 
factors that may explain the results. The discussion will 
conclude with clinical implications of the findings, 
recommendations for future resea rch, and limitations of 
the study. 
Overview of Results 
The first research question addressed gender 
differences in proneness to ruminative guilt, 
nonruminative guilt, and shame. Females disclosed much 
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higher levels than males of all three emotions, with the 
differences approaching one standard deviation. 
The second research question involved gender 
differences in levels of the four Rorschach psychological 
symptoms. The only symptom variable for which gender 
differences were detected was narcissism, on which males 
scored almost one standard deviation higher than females. 
The third research question investigated gender 
differences in the levels of the three Rorschach positive 
psychological functioning variables. No gender 
differences were detected on any of the indices of 
positive functioning. 
The fourth research question addressed gender 
differences in the multivariate relationships among the 
self-conscious emotion variables and the four Rorschach 
symptom indices . For males, ruminative guilt was the 
predominant self-conscious emotion in depression, whereas 
none of the emotion variables figured prominently in the 
depression of females. For males, all three emotions were 
associated with narcissism, with ruminative guilt having 
the strongest relationship. No association between the 
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emotions and narcissism was fo und for females. For 
females, nonruminative guilt was related to the absence of 
dysphoric affect and, to a lesser degree, the absence of 
anger, whereas dysphoric affect and anger did not figure 
prominently in any of the multivariate relationships for 
males. 
The fifth research question involved gender 
differences in the multivariate relationships among the 
self-conscious emotion variables and the three Rorschach 
positive functioning indices. For males, the level of 
need for affection was associated with high levels of 
shame and somewhat lower levels of ruminative guilt. For 
females, the opposite pattern appeared. Greater need for 
affection was related to high levels of ruminative guilt 
and mod erate levels of shame. For males, no association 
was detected between the emotions and self - inspection, 
whereas the self-inspection of females was associated with 
moderate levels of nonruminative guilt. Cooperation in 
males was mildly related to all three emotions, with 
ruminative guilt having the strongest relationship. In 
contrast, the cooperation of females was strongly 
associated with nonruminative guilt. 
Gender Differences in the Emotion and 
Psychological Functioning Variables 
Gen der Differences in the Self-Conscious Emotions 
Con sistent with limited previous research (e.g., 
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Ha r de r e t a l ., 1992; Ferguson & Crowley, 1993, 1996; 
Shiffler, 1 9 93 ) , females exhibited higher levels than did 
males o f proneness to the emotions of ruminative guilt, 
nonruminative guilt, and shame. These results may be due 
t o th e tendency of women to report more intensity of 
emo ti o nal experience than do men (cf. Brody, 1996; 
LaFrance & Banaji, 1992; Shields, 1991), especially when 
the emotion occurs in an interpersonal context. However, 
Brody ( 1996) presented a compelling argument that women's 
report of more intense emotions is representative of 
actual experience rather than greater willingness to self-
report emotional experience. Although the question 
certainly deserves further study, it is certainly possible 
that at least some of the difference between men's and 
women's reports of proneness to the self-conscious 
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emotions of ruminative guilt, nonruminative guilt, and 
shame is a result of actual gender differences in the 
experience of emotion. 
This research has examined only sex differences and 
has not considered the influence of gender role. However, 
sex appears to have much less to do with the quality and 
intensity of emotional expression than do certain gender-
related personality characteristics, such as nurturance 
(Brody, Hay, & Vandewater, 1990; Ferguson & Crowley, 
1996) . The effect of gender role on the experience of 
guilt and shame--and how that might be captured by the 
Rorschach--requires further research. 
Socialization of Gender 
Differences in Guilt-
Proneness 
In light of the greater tendency of women to color 
their interpretation of and response to their experiences 
with guilt and shame, it is logical to ask how these 
emotions originate. Why do women, more than men, tend to 
rely on the self-conscious emotions? Although some 
authors present strong arguments for the existence of 
biological underpinnings to explain higher levels of 
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guilt- and shame-proneness in females (e.g., Nathanson, 
1992), others lean towards the differential socialization 
of boys and girls. Many of these socialization 
differences have been substantiated through research. 
A ruminative guilt style is believed to be the result 
of genuine caring and love for others that has become 
exaggerated and unhealthy (Modell, 1971; Friedman, 1985) 
Zahn-Waxler et al. (1991) reported that when children are 
encouraged to feel high levels of empathy and to 
experience the emotions and problems of others, they 
eventually have difficulty recognizing their own needs and 
discriminating their needs from the needs of others. 
Within the context of these blurred boundaries, children 
come to behave as if the problems of others were their own 
and acquire feelings of guilt and responsibility for those 
problems. 
Infant girls tend to be less emotionally expressive 
than infant boys and, in an attempt to amplify their 
daughters' emotional responsiveness, mothers tend to talk 
more about emotions with their daughters than sons, and 
are also more animated and emotional with them (Barrett, 
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1995; Brody, 1996). Barrett (1995) has suggested that 
this higher level of emotionality in communication 
increases the hearer's appreciation of the personal 
relevance of the message. This greater emotionality 
communicated to daughters may increase their feelings of 
empathy and responsibility for the distress of others. At 
the same time, parents tend to emphasize control of 
emotions more with their sons than with their daughters. 
Gender differences in responsiveness to the distress 
of others appears by the end of the second year of life 
(Zahn-Waxler & Robinson, 1995). Because girls receive 
more empathy training than boys, their vulnerability to 
guilt-inducing communications is increased (Zahn-Waxler et 
al., 1991). Their higher level of identification with 
their mothers may also affect the expression of emotions 
related to maintaining relationships (Brody, 1996). 
Guilt feelings are more likely to occur in the 
presence of real or perceived responsibility for the 
distress of others (Zahn-Waxler & Robinson, 1995). 
Because girls are socialized more than boys to value and 
nurture relationships, they have increased susceptibility 
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to guilt when they perceive that they have harmed others. 
In their examination of depressed mothers, Zahn-
Waxler et al. ( 1991) found that girls are more 
empathically involved in their parents' relationships and 
experience more guilt over parental conflict. Girls more 
than boys may identify with their mothers, increasing the 
likelihood that they will imitate a depressed mother's 
attributional style. Because girls are socialized to 
express affection and affiliation and to exercise extreme 
control over aggression and feelings of anger, they are 
particularly vulnerable to feelings of guilt when they 
feel angry, act aggressively, or cause interpersonal harm 
(Potter-Efron , 1989; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1991; Zahn-Waxler 
& Kochanska, 1990). 
Socialization of Gender 
Differences in Shame-
Proneness 
The socialization of interpersonal needs in girls, 
coupled with a fear of the loss of love, also increases 
their vulnerability to shame (Kaufman, 1989; H. B. Lewis, 
1979b) . Boys, on the other hand, are socialized to value 
performance related to objects and things. When a boy 
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acts aggressively, his parents may do nothing to inhibit 
his behavior, and may even encourage it. When a girl 
exhibits aggression, thereby threatening valued 
relationships, her behavior may be met with direct 
punishment or the withdrawal of love, which elicits 
feelings of shame (M. Lewis, 1992). 
M. Lewis (1992) proposed that the emotional response 
to success or failure is socialized. Whereas men are 
taught to reward themselves for their successes but not to 
blame themselves for their failures, the reverse is true 
for women. Parents tend to make more positive 
attributions to boys than to girls and more negative 
attributions to girls than to boys. This pattern is also 
found in the interactions of school teachers with their 
male and females students (Minuchen & Shapiro, 1983), 
resulting in girls being exposed to more communications 
that imply that they are in some way defective. In 
addition, mothers use less physical punishment with their 
daughters than with their sons and may, therefore, employ 
more shame-inducing punishments with their daughters (M. 
Lewis, 1992). 
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There may, of course, be reasons in addition to 
socialization differences that females are more prone than 
males to the self-conscious emotions. However, it appears 
that women's greater vulnerability to guilt- and shame-
proneness may be, at least in part, a result of 
differences in the socialization of girls and boys. 
Gender Differences in Psychological Functioning 
The only psychological functioning variable in which 
gender differences were detected was narcissism, which was 
higher for males than females. This suggests that males 
are more likely than females to use grandiosity as a 
defense and may, as a result, keep emotional responses out 
of awareness. 
Although ot her differences were expected, especially 
in light of the frequent finding of more depression in 
females than in males, it is important to recall that the 
Rorschach normative data show no gender differences for 
the variables in question (Exner, 1993). It may be that 
the characteristics of depression that differentiate males 
and females are not measured well by the DEPI of the 
Rorschach (e.g ., helplessness and hopelessness, as 
discussed in Chapter II, Review of Literature). 
Alternatively, rather than reflecting methodological 
limitations, it might be that men and women actually do 
not differ in the intensity of their psychological 
symptoms when assessed with measures that are less 
susceptible to the influence of self-presentational 
concern s. 
Self-Conscious Emotions and Psychological Symptoms 
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The Rorschach and the TOSCA--M clearly operate at 
different levels of subject awareness. Because of the 
ambiguity of the Rorschach testing situation, the 
Rorschach is likely to elicit responses that are less 
guarded and less strongly defended than responses to most 
other instruments. It is possible that, in responding to 
the Rorschach, subjects may even unknowingly reveal things 
about themselves that they have not yet allowed into their 
own awareness. At the same time, the more straightforward 
approach of the TOSCA--M may activate stronger self-
presentational defenses, allowing respondents to put forth 
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a better front for the world and even to deny awareness of 
some psychological factors. This disparity in the levels 
of awareness assessed by the two instruments might account 
for some of the results, in which unexpected relationships 
emerged between the emotions and the indicators of 
psychological functioning (Weiner, 1995a). In fact, it 
may be possible to expla in differences between the results 
of the present research and the prior research of Tangney 
and others by examining differences in measurement of the 
constructs. In most previous research, psychopathology 
and the self-conscious emotions were measured at the same 
level of awareness, with face valid instruments, thus 
raising the possibility that the results were influenced 
by participant self-presentation response set. 
Self-Conscious Emotions and Depression 
Nonruminative Guilt 
and Depression 
For the total sample, nonruminative guilt had a very 
small negative correlation with depression. For males, 
the negative relationship was negligible, whereas for 
females, the negative correlation was very small. This 
finding is consistent with the prediction that 
nonruminative guilt would not relate meaningfully to 
depression. 
Ruminative Guilt 
and Depression 
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Small negative correlations between ruminative guilt 
and depression were observed for the total sample and for 
males, whereas the correlation for females was very small. 
In the multivariate relationships between the three 
emotion variables and depression, no clear pattern emerged 
for the entire sample or for fe males. For males, however, 
ruminative guilt appeared to function as the best 
predictor of the extent to which signs of depression were 
present. This suggests that when the contributions of all 
three emotions are cons idered together , higher levels of 
ruminative guilt account the most for depressive symptoms 
in men. It appears that the depression of males may be 
characterized by a tendency towards rumination in which 
the individual constantly replays unhappy incidents and 
refuses to let go of feelings of responsibility. The 
finding that ruminative guilt is more characteristic of 
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males' depression is consistent with other research 
results. For example, externalizing behaviors are 
believed to be more representative of the depression of 
males and involve (among other behaviors) increased 
activity level as a form of distraction (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1987 ) . 
Shame and Depression 
Contrary to predictions, the correlation between 
sham e and depression, although small, was in a negative 
direction for the total sample. For males, the 
correlation was negligible. Results of the multivariate 
analysis for males suggest that when all three emotions 
are considered together, shame is not an important factor 
in predicting depression. 
Contrary to predictions, a small negative correlation 
between shame and depression was observed for females. 
Although the multivariate analysis for females did not 
account for an important portion of the variance and was 
not reported in the Results section, examination of the 
structure and function coefficients (see Table 14) 
suggests that shame no more strongly predicts depression 
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'Table 14 
IDiscriminant Function Predicting Depression in Females 
Emotion 
Function 
Coefficient 
Structure 
Coefficient 
Nonruminative guilt .69 .70 
Ruminative guilt -.25 .58 
Shame .88 .74 
in females than either ruminative or nonruminative guilt. 
Why this is the case is discussed below. 
Because past research has consistently found 
relationships between shame-proneness and depression, the 
failure of the present research to find a strong link 
between shame and depression is, at first glance, somewhat 
puzzling. The bivariate correlations, in which the 
presence of depression correlates negatively with all 
three emotions, add to the enigma. However, Tangney 
(1993) provided a clue that may help to explain the 
results. She posited that shame-proneness leads to 
feelings of hopelessness, which have been linked to the 
development of depression. Helplessness and hopelessness 
seem to have strong cognitive components, commonly 
evidenced by dire predictions about the future, such as 
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"I'll never be able to do it," or "Nothing I do can ever 
change it." In a like manner, cognitive components of the 
three self-conscious emotions seem to be reflected in many 
of the TOSCA---M items, such as "You would think, 'I'm 
terrible, 111 or "You would feel selfish and you'd think you 
are basically lazy." However, as previously noted, the 
DEPI of the Rorschach does not do a good job of tapping 
into helpless, hopeless depression. The DEPI and the 
TOSCA- -M may, therefore, both be measuring important but 
separate characteristics that contribute to depression. 
Perhaps the more salient reason for the negative 
correlations between the emotion variables and depression 
has to do with the measures themselves and the differing 
levels of awareness at which depression and the emotions 
were assessed. The negative correlations may, in fact, 
represent an attempt on the part of depressed subjects to 
guard against negative feelings about the self, and 
perhaps even to protect themselves from awareness of their 
feelings of depression. Again, even though the bivariate 
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correlations revealed negative relationships, it is 
important to emphasize results of the discriminant 
analysis, which essentially showed that all three emotion 
variables were positively related to depression in 
females. 
This finding is reminiscent of observations made by 
H. B. Lewis (1971), who described a cycle in which any one 
of the three self-conscious emotions can become part of a 
sequence that leads to the formation of psychological 
symptoms. When a shameful event occurs, rumination about 
the event causes the person to feel guilty. If 
unresolved, the guilt then leads to feelings of shame. 
Continuing to snowball, the shame feeds back into guilt, 
which develops into a sense of ''irrational dread." Unless 
the feelings can be normally discharged (e.g., by the 
person being forgiven or accepting forgiveness), they come 
to be expressed as symptoms. 
Self-Conscious Emotions and Narcissism 
Nonruminative Guilt 
and Narcissism 
For the total sample and for females, correlations 
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between nonruminative guilt and narcissism were 
negligible. For males, narcissism correlated positively 
with nonruminative guilt. Nonruminative guilt as a factor 
in the self-presentation of narcissistic males may reflect 
a tendency to do the right thing in social situations in 
the interest of preserving their mien of superiority. 
Ruminative Guilt and Narcissism 
For the total sample and for females, correlations 
between ruminative guilt and narcissism were very small. 
For males, however, narcissism correlated positively with 
ruminative guilt at both the bivariate and multivariate 
levels. 
At first glance it seems counterintuitive that both 
ruminative guilt and nonruminative guilt would relate 
positively to narcissism . However, it is important to 
recall the nature of ruminative guilt, in which the person 
may well have done all that could reasonably be done to 
remedy the situation (reflecting nonruminative guilt), but 
then continue to feel guilty for the infraction. This 
continued rumination is the necessary ingredient for 
ruminative guilt. The narcissist may employ nonruminative 
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guilt in the interest of protecting his public image, but 
then continue to ruminate about his actions due to a 
nagging worry that even more may be required if he is to 
continue to present himself as superior to others. 
Shame and Narcissism 
The predicted relationship between shame and 
narcissism was not found in the bivariate analyses for the 
total sample or for females. For males the correlation 
was small. However, multivariate analysis revealed that 
shame makes a contribution to narcissism in males that is 
not as strong as the other self-conscious emotions but 
nevertheless important. 
Why the predicted strong relationship between 
narcissism and shame did not appear may be a function of 
the dual nature of narcissism. Malatesta and Wilson 
(1988) have suggested that there are two types of 
pathological narcissism. Pseudograndiosity, the first 
type, is a defense against feelings of inferiority. The 
second, true grandiosity, is diffuse, egocentric 
grandiosity without the feelings of inferiority. It is 
the pseudograndiose type of narcissism that would be 
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expected to correlate with shame. Because the reflection 
score of the Rorschach considers narcissism as a whole, 
without distinguishing between grandiose narcissism and 
narcissism based on defending against feelings of 
inferiority, any relationship between shame and narcissism 
based on feelings of inferiority could be masked. 
Looking to past research on the relationship between 
shame and narcissism seems to shed little light on the 
issue of pseudograndiosity versus true grandiosity. For 
example, Gramzow and Tangney (1992) found the more 
pathological aspects of narcissism (i.e., exploitative-
ness) to be related to shame. However, it is not clear 
whether there are similarities between the exploitative 
narcissism measured in their research and pseudograndiose 
narcissism based on feelings of inferiority. Another 
important point to consider is that the Gramzow and 
Tangney conclusions are based on quite small correlations 
that achieved statistical significance due to a very large 
sample size. Their "statistically significant" bivariate 
correlation of .14 between exploitative narcissism and 
shame is, in fact, very small and is exceeded in the 
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current research by the statistically nonsignificant 
correlation of .20 for males between shame and narcissism-
-also a small correlation. Realistically, the magnitudes 
of both correlations are very small, and r2 values derived 
from the correlation coefficients suggest that very little 
variance is accounted for by the relationships. 
Therefore, relying on statistical significance to 
interpret these findings is potentially misleading. 
Experienced Rorschachers are able to gain further 
information regarding the true nature of an individual 
subject's narcissism by examining the relationships 
between the number of reflection responses (the measure of 
narcissism ) , the number of vista responses (a measure of 
negative self-examination), and the egocentricity index (a 
measure of self - esteem). However, the conclusions of such 
analyses depend on rather complex "if. . then" 
relationships involving specific conclusions for different 
values or ranges of values for each of the variables 
(Exner, 1991). An oversimplified approach to examining 
these relationships with aggregated data might be to look 
at the correlations among the variables. For this sample, 
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the bivariate correlation between reflection (the measure 
of narcissism) and vista (a measure of negative self-
examination) was .34 (p = .001), suggesting that 
narcissism was related to negative self-inspection. 
Reflection also correlated moderately with the 
egocentricity index (r = .55, p = <.0005), suggesting that 
self-esteem increases as narcissism increases. However, 
because the reflection responses contribute to the 
egocentricity index score, the correlation is likely to be 
artificially inflated and interpretation is difficult. 
To investigate the possibility of a trend towards 
pseudograndiosity in the current sample, protocols 
containing at least one reflection response were examined 
for the presence of vista responses. Almost half of the 
protocols in which one or more reflection responses were 
given also contained at least one vista response, 
regardless of the level of self-esteem suggested by the 
egocentricity index. These subjects appear to be 
conflicted regarding their feelings of high self-value 
inasmuch as their self-examination also contains 
perceptions of negative features. The mean scores for the 
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self-conscious emotions for males and females in this 
subsample are presented in Table 15, along with the means 
for the males and females in the total sample and effect 
sizes for the differences. 
Although these results are preliminary, some 
interesting gender differences arise. Whereas the males 
in the subsample scored slightly higher than males in the 
total sample on both ruminative guilt and shame, subsample 
females actually scored lower than females in the total 
sample on the same two emotions, with rather substantial 
effect sizes for the differences. 
Table 15 
Comparison of Means on the Self-Conscious Emotions for 
the Total Sample and Subjects with One or More 
Reflection and Vista Responses
Males Females 
Emotion Total Subsample SMD Total Subsample SMD 
Nonruminative 57.23 59. 91 . 47 61.72 63.47 .31 
guilt 
Ruminative 44.40 46.09 .23 52.32 45.37 .76 
guilt 
Shame 40.00 43.91 .37 47.77 41.89 .56 
It appears that different processes may be at work 
for males and females who give reflection responses 
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coupled with vista responses on the Rorschach. For males, 
this combination appears to relate to mildly increased 
feelings of inferiority and ruminations about perceived 
infractions. However, females who give reflection and 
vista responses may be more strongly defended against 
negative feelings about the self, including a defense 
against allowing into awareness the negative aspects of 
their self-inspection. They are, however, alert to the 
impact of their self-presentation, and believing that 
revelation of negative emotion states might have an 
adverse effect on others' perceptions of them, they may 
guard against disclosing anything that might jeopardize 
their public image. Clearly, additional research will be 
required to investigate the nature of Rorschach narcissism 
as it relates to shame-proneness. 
It is also possible that different results would be 
obtained by conducting the research with clinically 
narcissistic subjects. College students whose Rorschachs 
indicate the presence of narcissism may differ 
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qualitatively from persons in a clinical setting whose 
narcissism painfully interferes with their relationships. 
Future research is needed to determine how shame relates 
to clinically significant levels of narcissism. Such 
research would provide valuable information that could be 
applied to improving the treatment of narcissism. 
Self-Conscious Emotions and Anger 
None of the self-conscious emotions figured 
prominently in the bivariate or multivariate analyses 
involving anger for the total sample or for males. For 
females, however, ruminative guilt had a small negative 
correlation with anger. In addition, an interesting 
difference between males and females appeared in the 
relationships between anger and the self-conscious 
emotions. For males, all of the correlations were 
approximately zero (-.01 to .05). However, correlations 
for females were somewhat larger and were all in the 
negative direction (-.14 to -.22), with the strongest 
correlation being for ruminative guilt. It is possible 
that females, who are socialized more than males to value 
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relationships, are sensitized by higher levels of 
ruminative guilt to the potential for damaging their 
relationships if they openly express anger. Thus, females 
may be more likely than males to mask or hide their anger. 
This conclusion would be consistent with recent research 
by Ferguson and Crowley (in press b) showing that when 
suppressed anger is taken into consideration, males and 
females experience similar amounts of anger. 
The finding, inconsistent with past research, of no 
important relationships between shame and anger in any of 
the analyses, may be a function of measurement. It is 
possible that Rorschach anger differs in quality from the 
anger assessed by pencil-and-paper measures used in 
previous guilt and shame research. Rorschach believed 
that the use of white space required an alteration in the 
figure-ground relationship that symbolized a form of 
negativism or oppositionality (Exner, 1986). At least 
some empirical support exists for this position (e.g., 
Stein, 1973). Because the Rorschach assesses anger at a 
different level of awareness than other measures of anger, 
cognitive and/or affective differences are likely to exist 
between Rorschach's oppositional anger and the hostile 
anger assessed by other measures. 
Self-Conscious Emotions and Dysphoric Affect 
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No important relationships were detected between 
dysphoric affect and any of the three self-conscious 
emotions in either the multivariate analyses or the 
bivariate correlations for the total sample or for males. 
In the multivariate analysis for females, a moderate 
negative correlation was found between dysphoric affect 
and nonruminative guilt. In addition, different patterns 
of bivariate correlations between dysphoric affect and the 
self-conscious emotions emerged between males and females. 
For males, the correlations ranged between .03 and .14 and 
were all in the positive direction. However, correlations 
for females were somewhat larger and were all in the 
negative direction, ranging from -.15 to -.23, with the 
strongest relationship being between dysphoric affect and 
nonruminative guilt. 
These results suggest that females may be less likely 
than males to experience dysphoric affect in connection 
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with the self-conscious emotions--particularly 
nonruminative guilt. However, the results may be an 
artifact of the different levels of awareness assessed by 
the Rorschach and the TOSCA--M. Females experiencing 
higher levels of the self-conscious emotions may be more 
acutely aware of the negative impact that their dysphoria 
could have on their relationships. Obviously, defending 
themselves against awareness or admission of dysphoric 
feelings would be an easier task in responding to the 
TOSCA--M than to the Rorschach. 
It is also important to consider that the dysphoric 
affect variable is a rather broad variable, being composed 
of four shading variables. Of these four variables, 
diffuse shading (Y) is believed to reflect distress that 
is more situational and transient in nature. Achromatic 
color (C') responses represent any of a number of 
internalized negative feelings. Vista (V) is indicative 
of negative self-examination, whereas texture (T) 
responses signify the level of need for affection (Exner, 
1991) These four variables each have a very low base 
rate, with the general population mode for C' and T being 
134 
1, and for Y and V being 0 (Exner, 1993). Although 
aggregating the data increases reliability, the low base 
rate hinders the measurement of subclinical levels of 
dysphoria, which were more likely to occur than were 
clinical levels with this sample. Also, it is likely that 
these four variables differ in their relationships to the 
three self-conscious emotions. Aggregating them into one 
variable may disguise the unique nature of the individual 
variables and how they relate to guilt and shame. The 
intercorrelations in this research among the four 
variables, presented in Table 16, suggest that because 
Table 16 
Correlations Among the Rorschach Variables Composing 
Dysphoric Affect 
Variable 
C' 
V 
y 
C' V y T 
T 
1.00 
.20 
.40 
.06 
1.00 
.32 
-.07 
1.00 
.20 1.00 
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there was little relationship among most of the variables, 
they may, in fact, have canceled each other out. However, 
because of the low base rates, it would not be prudent to 
examine correlations between the emotion variables and the 
four components of dysphoric affect . 
Self - Consci ous Emotions and Positive 
Psychological Functioning 
Self-Conscious Emotions and Cooperation 
Nonruminative Guilt 
and Cooperation 
The predicted bivariate association between 
nonruminative guilt and cooperation in relationships 
appeared in the total sample and for females, but not for 
males . In the multivariate analyses, the expected 
relationship appeared only for females. This result may 
be a reflection of the greater value placed on 
relationships by females, as opposed to males. Females 
who are more trustworthy and likable in their 
relationships may rely on nonruminative guilt to prompt 
behaviors that increase the likelihood of maintaining 
their interpersonal relationships. 
Ruminative Guilt 
and Cooperation 
Ruminative guilt did not have an important 
association with cooperation in either the bivariate or 
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multivariate analyses for the total sample or for females. 
Fo r males, however, ruminative guilt had a higher 
bivariate correlation with cooperation (.20) than with any 
of the other emotion variables. In the multivariate 
analysis, cooperation was mildly associated with all three 
emotions, particularly with ruminative guilt. It is 
possible that males who place greater value on 
relationships than males in general are more likely to 
ruminate about behaviors that they perceive as having the 
potential for harming their relationships. Their 
cooperation may then take on a negative quality, such as 
is observed in abusive relationships and in persons with 
strong dependencies in their significant relationships. 
Shame and Cooperation 
Shame was not associated with cooperation in any of 
the bivariate or the multivariate analyses for the total 
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sample, nor for males and females separately. 
Self-Conscious Emotions and Need for Affection 
Perhaps the most striking result of the current 
research was the association between the need for 
affection and levels of the self-conscious emotions. 
Although need for affection is healthy and positive at the 
optimal level, unhealthy levels of neediness in 
relationships do exist and appear to be associated with 
the self - conscious emotions. 
Nonruminative Guilt 
and Need for Affection 
Nonruminative guilt did not figure prominently in the 
bivariate correlations, nor in the multivariate analyses 
of the total sample, or of the genders separately. 
Ruminative Guilt and 
Need for Affection 
In the bivariate correlations, ruminative guilt was 
moderately correlated with need for affection for the 
total sample and for males and females when considered 
separately. In the multivariate analysis for the total 
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sample, ruminative guilt was associated more strongly with 
the need for affection than any other emotion variable. 
For males, ruminative guilt was associated with the need 
for affection but was not the chief self-conscious 
emotion . For females, ruminative guilt appeared to be the 
predominant emotion associated with an unhealthy neediness 
for affection. Ruminative guilt may prompt females who 
are needy in relationships to ruminate about behaviors 
that they believe may have harmed their relationships 
(Baumeister et al., 1994). Emotionally needy women 
probably tend to repeatedly relive their relationship 
transgressions in imagination and believe that there is 
nothing they can do to ever make up for them. Their 
ruminations may also serve as a defense against shame. 
Shame and Need for Affection 
For the total sample, a moderate bivariate 
correlation was obtained between shame and need for 
affection. In the multivariate analysis, shame was 
associated with the need for affection, although to a 
lesser degree in the total sample than did ruminative 
guilt. For males, shame was moderately correlated with 
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need for affection, and when the three emotion variables 
were considered together, shame had the strongest 
relationship with the need for affection. For females, 
shame had an important association with need for 
affection, but less so than ruminative guilt. 
It appears that for men, an unhealthy level of 
neediness in relationships corresponds to high levels of 
shame. Men who are emotionally needy in their cu rrent 
relationships or who have experienced some type of 
emotional loss may see themselves as defective and 
worthless. In contrast, emotionally needy women appear 
less likely to focus their attention on their own 
unworthiness and more on their relationships. 
The finding that ruminative guilt in females was more 
strongly associated with need for affection than was 
shame, whereas shame was the chief emotion for men, is 
somewhat surprising in light of the current wisdom 
suggesting that women rely more heavily than men on the 
emotion of shame to organize their experience (e.g., H. B. 
Lewis, 1971). However, such conclusions were reached 
before serious consideration was given to the role of 
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ruminative guilt in the formation of psychological 
symptoms. It is possible that ruminative guilt, in which 
the focus is on inadequate behavior, functions either as a 
defense against shame or, alternatively, as a necessary 
precursor to shame, in which the focus is redirected onto 
the inadequate self. In either case, the presence of 
ruminati v e guilt suggests an increased vulnerability to 
shame. However, some women may be more successful than 
others at defending themselves against feelings of shame, 
and the shame may never emerge. Thus, although the 
presence of ruminative guilt may signal the presence of 
defended shame, it does not necessarily guarantee that 
shame is present or even predict that it will follow. 
Interestingly, the tendency to deny the need for 
affection, at the opposite end of the need-for-emotion 
continuum, appears to be associated with lower levels of 
ruminative guilt and shame. However, this may be a 
function of the manner in which the variables were 
assessed, with the need for affection being measured at a 
lower level of awareness than were the self-conscious 
emotions. It is logical that individuals who are denying 
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their need for affection would also tend to defend 
themselves from appearing to be ruminatively guilty or 
shameful. 
It is also interesting to speculate about why a large 
proportion of subjects gave no texture response, 
indicating that they were denying the need for affection. 
Perhaps this relates to the fact that many introduct o ry 
psychology students are freshmen, away from home for the 
first time. This is a time of individuation for many 
students, when they learn to exercise their autonomy and 
are making decisions about how heavily they will rely on 
their parents for emotional support. It may be that these 
very struggles to define themselves and strengthen their 
self-reliance prompt a temporary denial of the need for 
affection--a least as far as that affection would come 
from their parents. This would be an interesting question 
for future research. 
Self-Conscious Emotions and Self-Inspection 
Nonruminative Guilt 
and Self-Inspection 
No important relationships were found in the 
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bivariate or multivariate analyses between self-inspection 
and nonruminative guilt for the total sample or for males. 
For females, however, the multivariate analysis revealed 
that nonruminative guilt contributes to higher levels of 
self-inspection, possibly promoting appropriate reparation 
for transgressions, followed by a sense of closure. 
Self-Inspection and 
Ruminative Guilt 
Ruminative guilt did not appear to be important in 
understanding the level of self-inspection of the total 
sample or of the two genders separately. 
Self-Inspection and Shame 
Shame did not factor significantly in the level of 
self-inspection for the entire sample, nor for the two 
genders separately. 
Although Rorschach self-inspection is generally 
considered to be a positive activity, higher levels of 
self-inspection are unusual and may be related to negative 
self-value. However, higher levels of self-inspection are 
not uncommon during certain periods of change in the life 
cycle (Exner, 1991). Certainly, college age represents a 
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time of change, and this may account for the positive 
relationship of self-inspection with nonruminative guilt 
but not with ruminative guilt or shame. 
Difficulties in the Measurement of Guilt and Shame 
Only one measure of gui lt- and shame-proneness 
(TOSCA--M) was employed in this research. Tangney (1996) 
conten ds that among the various assessments of these 
emotions, the TOSCA is the superior measure. However, the 
current literature reflects considerable discussion and 
controversy regarding what is the best and most accurate 
measure of these self-conscious emotions. Ferguson and 
Crowley (in press a) contend that there is not a "best" 
measure of proneness to guilt and shame but, rather, that 
the various measures assess different things. Consistent 
with this view, selection of a measure would depend on 
which aspects of guilt- and shame-proneness the researcher 
wished to measure. Only in the TOSCA is guilt represented 
as a positive, adaptive emotion. The focus of the current 
research on both the ruminative and nonruminative features 
of guilt-proneness led logically to use of the TOSCA--M, 
in which both are considered. 
Adequate measurement of the guilt and shame 
constructs has historically been difficult, and the 
TOSCA--M is not without its critics. The fact that the 
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Shame and Ruminative Guilt scales are strongly correlated 
has drawn criticism. However, these correlational results 
do not prove that the two scales are measuring the same 
thing. Consider, for example, that height is strongly 
correlated with level of education. That fact does not 
mean that height and level of education are the same. 
Rather, both are often a function of age. In the present 
research, the relationships of ruminative guilt and shame 
with the psychological functioning variables are clearly 
different. In addition, the TOSCA--M scales have been 
shown to have predictive validity (Ferguson & Crowley, in 
press a). 
This does not mean, however, that the TOSCA--M is the 
perfect measure of guilt- and shame-proneness. Because of 
the established psychometric soundness of the Rorschach, 
the lack of striking results in many areas of this 
research probably derives from the TOSCA--M. TOSCA--M 
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scenarios describe situations in which some type of 
feeling or action is unquestionably called for. In fact, 
in most of the scenarios, it would be socially 
inappropriate not to have some type of negative feeling in 
response to the event. It is possible that the TOSCA--M, 
part i cularly the Nonruminative Guilt scale, is strictly a 
me asure o f moral standards f o r whi c h there is general 
societal consensus (Ferguson & Crowley, in press a; Kugler 
& Jones, 1992) and of the negative affect that accompanies 
violati o n of those standards. 
Because this research has examined both the positive 
and negative aspects of guilt, one might ask why shame was 
not similarly represented. Clearly, shame has positive 
functions, such as promoting adherence to society's norms. 
However, for the purposes of this research, shame was 
considered to operate on a continuum, with the difference 
between pathological shame and healthy levels of shame 
being assessed only in terms of quantity rather than 
quality. Nevertheless, it might be argued that the 
crushing shame of persons whose lives are ruled by shame--
a shame that defines their very existence--differs 
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qualitatively from the shame measured by the TOSCA--M. 
Had these individuals been assessed, each and every 
scenario would undoubtedly have evoked levels of shame 
that most persons cannot even imagine, resulting in a 
ceiling effect for the instrument. Thus, regardless of 
whether the differences between healthy and pathological 
levels of shame are quantitative or qualitative, the 
TOSCA- -M clearly falls short of measuring the debilitating 
shame experienced by a segment of the clinical population. 
The results of this research might also have been 
influenced by the self-presentation style of the subjects. 
Just as most humans apply an evaluation process to help 
them choose what to say or do in a given situation, 
research subjects might edit their responses in order to 
present themselves as more psychologically healthy than 
they actually are. The Rorschach elicits a certain amount 
of editing from most respondents in order to censor 
socially unacceptable responses to the inkblots, 
especially blatantly violent or sexual responses (Exner, 
1993). But because of the ambiguous nature of the 
Rorschach, impression management is more difficult than 
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with many other measures, and respondents may 
unintentionally reveal characteristics that they might 
otherwise have concealed. On the other hand, less 
ambiguity is associated with scenarios of the TOSCA--M. 
Even though the indirectness of the scenario method may 
prevent respondents from ascertaining the exact purpose of 
the measure, most respondents would have little difficulty 
gauging the social appropriateness of each potential 
response and evaluating the relative health or wellness 
revealed by responding in that manner. Thus, the 
Rorschach and the TOSCA--M differ in their degree of 
indirectness, and any one subject may have unknowingly 
responded to the two measures with differing levels of 
guardedness. With this in mind, the need exists for a 
more veiled emotion measure that either matches the 
indirectness of the Rorschach or in some way avoids the 
pitfalls of social desirability response sets. 
Problems in Rorschach Research 
The Rorschach is unlike any other assessment 
instrument, and as such, a unique set of problems faces 
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researchers who wish to use the Rorschach in their 
studies. Included among these problems are the issues of 
using volunteer subjects, expecting congruence between the 
Rorschach and other measures, and examining individual 
Rorschach variables without consideration of their 
interactions with the other variables. 
Volunteer Subjects 
Participants in research studies have less at stake 
than do psychiatric patients who are referred for 
evaluation. As a result, they may respond differently 
than if they were concerned that the test results would be 
used to make decisions about their lives (Weiner, 1995a). 
As a result, the Rorschach results used in this research--
and the corresponding relationships with the self-
conscious emotion variables- --rnight differ from those that 
would have been obtained from psychiatric patients. 
Congruence with Other Instruments 
Weiner (1995a) has warned that researchers who expect 
congruence between Rorschach variables and other 
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instruments that measure the same aspect of personality 
are likely to be disappointed. The different tests assess 
psychological functioning at differing levels of 
awareness. Respondents' degree of objectivity and 
subjectivity will vary between the tests. An additional 
area of variation is the sensitivity of the variables to 
the test - taking attitudes of the respondents. Weiner has 
suggested that a preferred method of research would be to 
link Rorschach findings to observable personality 
characteristics of participants. 
Interactions Among Variables 
Weiner (1995b) also cautioned that the best 
understanding of an individual's personality functioning 
using the Rorschach is obtained by noting the interactions 
among the Rorschach variables and features. Using 
individual variables in isolation and expecting that they 
will reveal meaningful information will often lead to 
disappointment. Observing variable interactions increases 
the validity and the utility of information obtained from 
the Rorschach. 
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Implications for Future Research 
Future research might be directed towards using 
populations for which the measures are more relevant. 
There are inherent problems with using research findings 
from a normal population in formulating conclusions about 
psychopathology. It is a giant leap to assume that 
results from a normal population will generalize to 
clinical subjects. We may be wrong to assume that the 
relationship between guilt- and shame-proneness and 
psychopathology is a linear one, when instead the 
processes may not be the same at all and the quality of 
the emotion may be more critical than quantity. We would 
be better informed by future research that made use of a 
clinical sample to examine issues related to 
psychopathology. 
Even with a normal sample, a better vehicle for 
measuring pathological levels of guilt- and shame-
proneness within a scenario format might include more 
ambiguous situations, in which responsibility and/or 
controllability is not clear, or where pride might be 
evoked (Ferguson & Stegge, in press). Clinical experience 
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instructs us that the client whose identity is based on 
shame is ashamed about things that would elicit little or 
no shame response in other people. That being the case, 
scenarios that would be more useful in differentiating 
pathological levels of guilt and shame might be 
constructed with the help of clinical clients who feel 
guilt and shame in situations where those emotions are not 
commonly evoked. Such a scale would have the potential to 
more clearly differentiate problematic levels of the self-
conscious emotions. 
In order to further investigate the possibility that 
persons with clinically significant psychological symptoms 
would demonstrate different patterns of relationships 
between the emotion variables and the Rorschach variables, 
the bivariate correlations were repeated using only the 21 
subjects whose scores on the DEPI were 5 or higher. The 
raw scores for white space responses were used in place of 
the adjusted scores in order to increase the range for 
that variable. Results of the correlations are presented 
in Table 17. Although these results are preliminary and 
must be viewed with caution, some appeared that differed 
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from results in the total sample. 
Three interesting findings appeared in this subsample 
that differed from the results in the total sample. 
First, in contrast to the total sample where the 
Table 17 
Correlations (and Probabilities) for Subjects Positive on 
the DEPI Between the Emotion Variables and the 
Psychological Functioning Variables 
Rorschach 
variable 
Narcissism 
Anger 
Dysphoric 
affect 
Need for 
affection 
Self-
inspection 
Cooperation 
n 21 
Nonruminative 
guilt 
.01 
(. 76) 
-.19 
( .41) 
-.03 
(. 88) 
-.13 
(. 58) 
.18 
(. 44) 
.05 
(. 84) 
Ruminative 
guilt 
.07 
(. 76) 
.05 
(. 83) 
. 37 
( .10) 
.63 
(. 00) 
.46 
( . 04) 
.39 
(. 08) 
Shame 
-.07 
(. 76) 
-.02 
(. 92) 
.07 
(. 75) 
.56 
(. 01) 
.51 
(. 02) 
.26 
(. 2 6) 
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relationships between the emotions and dysphoric affect 
were very small and positive for males and small and 
negative for females, dysphoric affect in this small 
subgroup has a moderate positive relationship with 
ruminative guilt, suggesting that the dysphoric affect of 
depressed persons may be related to their guilty 
ruminations. 
The second difference is that self-inspection appears 
to be more negative in these depressed persons than in the 
normal population. Whereas self-inspection in these 
depressed subjects relates positively to both shame and 
ruminative guilt, self-inspection in the total sample was 
related only to nonruminative guilt for females. 
Finally, cooperation in depressed persons appears to 
take on a negative character, correlating positively with 
ruminative guilt and shame. In the total sample, 
cooperation was only mildly associated with ruminative 
guilt in males and moderately associated with 
nonruminative guilt in females, whereas for the depressed 
sample ruminative guilt and shame appear to be important 
elements of cooperation. It may be that depressed 
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individuals ruminate about their inability to do more in 
an attempt to mend breaches in their relationships and see 
themselves as defective for having transgressed in the 
first place. 
Consistent with the findings for the total sample, 
the contributions of shame and ruminative guilt to an 
unhealthy level of neediness for affection in 
relationships are observed in this segment of the sample . 
Implications of Guilt and Shame for Psychotherapy 
Because shame and ruminative guilt are frequent 
inhabitants of the therapy room, strategies for dealing 
effectively with these maladaptive emotions are vital. 
Treating Shame in Therapy 
The preliminary results of this study suggest that 
shame in depressed persons is related to high levels of 
self-inspection. Associated with this finding, Lindsay-
Hartz et al. (1995) have suggested that shame may arise 
when an individual accepts the opinion of others that some 
possibly unchangeable aspect of the self is unacceptable. 
In such cases of negative self-inspection, the client 
might be encouraged to challenge or educate others 
concerning the characteristic, or to accept that his or 
her perception differs from the perceptions of others. 
Encouraging the client to seek out social support from 
individuals who share the characteristic may also be 
helpful . 
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Shame-prone individuals frequently magnify one 
characteristic or aspect of their being to include their 
entire identity. This thinking interferes with their 
acknowledgment of other facets of their identity, and 
frequently they feel helpless to change. Such clients may 
benefit from learning to accept that although some aspect 
of their identity conflicts with their ideals, they need 
not view this feature as their entire entity. Where 
change is possible, they may be motivated to effect 
changes in their problem area (Lindsay-Hartz et al., 
1995) . 
Ward (1972) proposed that shame protects the client 
by preserving a certain stability of defenses. The client 
gauges the safety of revealing secrets and paces his or 
156 
her revelations accordingly. Such pacing serves to 
protect the client from the identity disorganization that 
might be the result of bringing material too rapidly into 
therapeutic focus. When the rate of exposure to shame is 
under the client's control, the exposed shame becomes less 
painful over time. 
Shame in the current research was related to 
unhealthy levels of neediness in relationships. Healing 
that shame, then, would be expected to reduce the need for 
affection to normal levels. Ward (1972) has suggested 
that the healing of shame can occur within the context of 
a therapeutic relationship in which the client feels safe 
to gradually reveal shameful material without the risk of 
being rejected by the therapist. Therapists who are 
willing to admit their own mistakes and model for their 
clients the ability to survive the experience give clients 
permission to risk revealing some of their own shameful 
experience. By labeling the shame emotion and identifying 
processes that lead to it, some of the power of the 
emotion is dissipated. Therapists might also urge clients 
to evaluate the costs in terms of emotional energy of 
keeping some aspects of themselves hidden in their 
relationships. 
Treating Guilt in Therapy 
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In this study's depressed subsample, ruminative guilt 
contributed to dysphoric affect, self-inspection, and an 
unhealthy need for affection. Ruminative guilt often 
persists in spite of reassurances from others that the 
person either has done all that is humanly possible to 
rectify a situation, or that he or she is not responsible 
for a perceived infraction. Epston (1991) effectively 
treated this irrational guilt through the use of 
paradoxical techniques, in which the client was assigned 
to confess the "sin" and then perform rather extreme--to 
the point of being humorous--acts of penance before 
absolution could be obtained. It seems logical that if 
clients can learn to view themselves with humor, their 
self-inspection will take on a more positive character. 
The resulting increased self-acceptance would likely 
contribute to decreased dependency in relationships. 
Cognitive-behavioral techniques are also used in the 
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treatment of ruminative guilt (Parsons, 1988). This 
psychotherapy focuses on making a connection between 
guilty thoughts and feelings of guilt, recognition that 
the cognitive distortions logically lead to guilty 
feelings, and forgiving rather than forgetting as the way 
t o move beyond the guilt feelings. 
Limitations of the Study 
The current study has four general limitations, the 
f ir st of whi c h relates to additional concerns regarding 
the assessment of guilt and shame. The assessment of 
emotion constructs in general is imprecise, with a history 
of questionable success in operationalizing the 
theoretical constructs . Self-report measures are 
vulnerable to the desire of subjects to present themselves 
well. Also, the results of studies of guilt- and shame-
proneness are influenced by the choice of assessment 
strategy (Crowley & Anderson, 1993; Ferguson & Crowley, 
1996) . Clearly, highly accurate measures of guilt- and 
shame-proneness remain as yet undeveloped, possibly 
reflecting the ongoing theoretical confusion that exists 
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in the conceptualization of self-conscious emotions. 
The second limitation of the study involves the 
generalizability of the results. The sample used in this 
research, reflecting the unique nature of the Utah State 
University population, was mostly white and predominantly 
members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints . Whether this sample provided data similar to that 
which would be found in other college settings is 
uncertain. In addition, generalizing data obtained from 
college students to other populations, which in this case 
would be a clinical population, is fraught with pitfalls. 
Clearly, the two populations are not equivalent, and the 
preliminary results of this study suggest that findings in 
a clinical sample would be different from those used in 
analogue research. Certainly, the very nature of the 
study, in which volunteer subjects were asked to meet 
individually with an examiner, restricted the sample to 
those subjects who would be somewhat comfortable in this 
type of situation, virtually eliminating persons who might 
have exhibited the highest levels of shame. The resulting 
sample is likely to have been composed of the "healthiest 
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of the healthy," thus restricting the range of shame and 
other variables of interest evidenced by the participants. 
Obviously, further research is needed to clarify the role 
of gender differences in guilt- and shame-proneness as 
t hey relate to psychological functioning in a clinical 
population. 
Third, the relative level of inexperience of the 
persons administering the Rorschach to subjects may have 
influenced the Rorschach results. For instance, some 
responses may not have been adequately inquired, with the 
result that determinants important to the questions in 
this research may have been underreported. Thus, the 
results of this research may differ from results that 
might be obtained by using more experienced Rorschachers. 
Finally, although this research is based on the 
theoretical assumption that proneness to guilt and shame 
creates increased vulnerability to various forms of 
psychopathology, the correlational results merely indicate 
that guilt- and shame-proneness are associated with 
elevated levels of psychological symptomatology. No 
causal link has yet been established. Clearly, 
longitudinal risk studies are needed to more directly 
investigate the possibility that guilt- and/or shame-
proneness function as etiological factors in the 
development of psychopathology. 
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The purpose of this study is to examine how personal attitudes 
a f fect cognitive-perceptua l abilities in c o llege students. 
Interested students can earn extra-credit for participation in 
th i s stud y ( the v alue of such credit has been determined by eac h 
co urse instructor , check with yours for specific details ). 
Participation requires (1) completion of questionnaires and (2) 
f or a selected group (21 participation in an individually 
adm i nistered cognitive-perceptual task (additional extra-cred i t 
will be earned by students who participate in this task). The 
questionnaires will be completed during class time and wil l take 
approximately 30 minutes to complete. The cognitive-perceptual 
task will take approximately 45 minutes and will be conducted in 
the USU Psychology Department Clinic. 
This experiment does NOT involve deception, nor risk o f any kind. 
However, the questionnaires require self-disclosure of personal 
attitudes and the cognitive-perceptual task requires responding 
to ambiguous stimuli. If any distress is observed in 
participants, the study will be stopped and the student will be 
referred to a local mental health facility (usually the Student 
Counseling Center) for an evaluation. 
Participation is voluntary and students may discontinue at any 
time during the experiment . However, extra-credit can only be 
given to those students who complete their participation in the 
study. 
All information is confidential and will be seen only by research 
assistants and the principle investigator. Student names or 
other personal identifiers will be recorded only to notify class 
instructors of student participation for extra-credit. 
This proJect has been approved by the Institutional Review Board 
at Utah State University. Any questions or concerns should be 
directed to Dr. S.L. Crowley, Assistant Professor of Psychology 
and Principal Investigator (750-1251). 
If you wish to participate in this research study, sign below. 
I HEREBY AGREE TO VOLUNTARILY PARTICIPATE IN THE RESEARCH PROJECT 
DESCRIBED ABOVE, AND UNDER THE CONDITIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE. 
Print name Student Signature Date e 
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TEST OF SELF-CONSCIOUS AFFECT--MODIFIED 
182 
TOSCA-M 
Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in day-to-day life, followed by 
several common reactions to those situations. 
As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate how 
likely you would be to react in each of the ways described. We ask you to rate all responses 
because people may feel or react more than one way to the same situation, or they may react 
different ways at different times. 
For example: 
A. You wake up early one morning. It is cold and rainy outside. 
1) You would telephone a friend to catch up on news. 1--2--3--4--5
not likely very likely 
2) You would take the extra time to read the paper. 1--2--3--4--5
not likely very likely 
3) You would feel disappointed that it's raining. 1--2--3--4--5
not likely very likely 
4) You would wonder why you woke up so early. 1--2--3--4--5
not likely very likely 
In the above example, I've rated ALL of the answers by circling a number. I circled a 11111 
for answer (1) because I wouldn't want to wake up a friend very early on Saturday morning -- so 
it's not at all likely that I would do that. I circled a 11511 for answer (2) because I almost 
always read the paper if I have time in the morning (very likely). I circled a "3" for answer (3) 
because for me it's about half and half. Sometimes I would be disappointed about the rain and 
sometimes I wouldn't -- it would depend on what I had planned. I circled a 11411 for answer (4) 
because I would probably wonder why I had awakened so early. 
PLEASE DO NOT SKIP ANY ITEMS - - RATE ALL RESPONSES. 
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A. You make plans to meet a friend for lunch. At 5 o'clock. you realize you stood him up. 
1) You cannot apologize enough for forgetting the 
appointment. 
2) You would think: "I'm inconsiderate." 
3) You would think: "Well, they'll understand." 
4) You would try to make it up to him as soon as 
possible. 
5) You would think: "My boss distracted me just 
before lunch . 11 
B. You break something at work and then hide it. 
6) You would think: "This is making me anxious. 
need to either fix it or get someone else to." 
7) You would think about quitting. 
8) For days would worry and are afraid what will 
happen if someone finds out. 
9) You would think: "A lot of things aren't made 
very well these days." 
10) You would think: "It was only an accident." 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
C. You are out with friends one evening and you're feeling especially witty and 
attractive. Your best friend's spouse seems to oarticularly enjoy your company. 
11) You would think: 11 1 should have been aware of 
what my best friend is feeling." 
12) You would feel happy with your appearance and 
personality. 
13) You would feel pleased to have made such a good 
impression. 
14) You just know that your best friend will blame 
you forever. 
15) You would think your best friend should pay 
attention to his/her spouse. 
16) You would probably avoid eye contact for a long 
time. 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1- -2--3- -4-- 5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3 -- 4-- 5 
not likely very likely 
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D. At work, you wait until the last minute to plan and project, and it turns out badly. 
E. 
F. 
17) You would bend over backwards to make it up to 
your boss and colleagues. 
18) You would feel incompetent. 
19) You would think: "There are never enough hours 
in the day." 
20) You would feel: "I deserve to be reprimanded." 
21) You would think: "What's done is done." 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4 - -5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1- -2- -3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
You make a mistake at work and find out a co-worker is blamed for the error. 
22) You would think the company did not like the 
co-worker. 
23) You would think: "Life is not fair." 
24) You would keep quiet and avoid the co-worker. 
25) You would feel horrified about what happened 
but afraid to correct the situation. 
26) You would feel unhappy and eager to correct 
the situation. 
1--2--3--4- -5 
not likely very likely 
1--2 - -3--4 - -5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
For several days you put off making a difficult phone call. At the last minute you make 
the call and are able to manipulate the conversation so that all goes well. 
27) You would think: "I guess I'm more persuasive 
than I thought." 
28) You would regret that you put it off . 
29) You would feel like a coward. 
30) You would think: "I did a good job." 
31) You would feel badly about getting off so 
easily and feel "funny" whenever you thought 
about the call. 
32) You would think you shouldn't have to make 
calls you feel pressured into. 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
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G. You make a commitment to diet. but when you pass the bakery you buy a dozen donuts. 
33) Next meal, you would eat celery to make up for 
it. 
34) You would think: "They looked too good to pass 
by." 
35) You would feel disgusted with your lack cf 
will-power and self-control. 
36) You would think: "Once won't matter." 
37) You keep thinking: "How could I do something I 
know I shouldn't?" 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1- -2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3- -4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
H. While playing around. you throw a ball and it hits your friend in the face. 
I. 
38) You would feel inadequate that you can't even 
throw a bat l. 
39) You would think maybe your friend needs more 
practice at catching. 
40) You would feel horrible, apologize over the next 
several days, and not want to play ball again. 
41) You would think: "It was just an accident." 
42) You would apologize and make sure your friend 
feels better. 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1-- 2--3 -- 4--5 
not likely very likely 
1-- 2--3--4- -5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
You have recently moved away from your family and everyone has been very helpful. A few 
times you needed to borrow money but you paid it back as soon as you could. 
43) You would feel immature. 
44) You would think: "l sure ran into some bad luck. 
45) You would return the favor as quickly as you 
could. 
46) You would think: "l 'm a trustworthy person." 
47) You would be proud that you repaid your debts. 
48) You would think: "I shou ld never have to ask 
for things from my family. 11 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1- -2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
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J. You are driving down the road and you hit a small animal. 
49) You would think the animal shouldn't have 
been on the road. 
50) You would think: "I'm terrible." 
51) You would feel: "Well, it was an accident." 
52) You just know you could've done something 
to avoid it. 
53) You would probably think it over several 
times wondering if you could have avoided it. 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
K. You walk out of an exam thinking you did extremely well. Then you find out you did 
L. 
poorly. 
54) You would think: "Well, it's just a test." 
55) You would think: "The instructor doesn't 
like me." 
56) You would think: "I should have studied 
harder." 
57) You would feel stupid. 
58) You keep thinking back to all the things you 
did wrong in preparing for the exam. 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2- -3- -4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1- -2-- 3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
You and a group of co-workers worked very hard on a project. Your boss singles you out 
for a bonus because the proj ect was such a success. 
59) You would feel the boss is rather short-
sighted. 
60) You would feel alone and apart from your 
col leagues. 
61) You would feel your hard work paid off. 
62) You would feel competent and proud of yourself. 
63) You would feel you should not accept it. 
64) You would think: "I didn't work hard enough to 
deserve a bonus" and would feel badly for 
getting one. 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1-- 2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2- -3- -4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
M. While out with a group of friends. you make fun of a friend who's not there. 
65) You would think: "It was all in fun; it's 
harmless." 
66) You would feel small·-like a rat. 
67) You would think that perhaps that friend should 
have been there to defend himself/herself. 
68) You would berate yourself for it and vow to 
never do it again. 
69) You would apologize and talk about that 
person's good points. 
1··2-·3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1- -2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1- -2·-3--4·-5 
not likely very likely 
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N. You make a big mistake on an important proiect at work. People were depending on you. and 
your boss criticizes you. 
70) You would th i nk your boss should have been more 
clear about what was expected of you. 
71) You would walk around for days kicking yourself 
because you think the criticism was well 
deserved. 
72) You would feel like you wanted to hide. 
73) You would think: "I should have recognized 
the problem and done a better job." 
74) You would think: "Well, nobody's perfect." 
1- -2 - -3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1· -2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1- -2·-3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1· -2--3-·4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
0. You volunteer to help with the local Special Olympics for handicapped children. It turns 
out to be frustrating and time-consuming work. You think seriously about quitting. but 
then you see how happy the kids are. 
75) You would feel selfish and you'd think you are 
basically lazy. 
76) You're appalled that you would even consider 
letting those kids down. 
77) You would feel you were forced into doing 
something you did not want to do. 
78) You would think: "! should be more concerned 
about people who are less fortunate." 
79) You would feel great that you had helped 
others. 
80) You would feel very satisfied with yourself. 
1- -2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1- -2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
1--2--3--4--5 
not likely very likely 
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